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LITIGATING TIME IN AMERICA AT THE TURN OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY
Jenni Parrish∗
“We are born in haste, . . . we finish our education on the run; we
marry on the wing; we make a fortune at a stroke, and lose it in the
same manner. . . . Our body is a locomotive, going at the rate of
twenty-five miles an hour; our soul, a high-pressure engine; our life a
shooting star, and death overtakes us at last like a flash of lightening.”
—Michel Chevalier (1839)1

I. INTRODUCTION
A recent New York Times review of the popular television show
“24” begins by calling it “one of the most interesting new shows to
appear on television in a long time.”2 It goes on to criticize the acting as
“terrible,” the writing as “uninspired,” and the directing “ranges from
perverse to nonexistent.”3 Then comes the praise.
What is marvelous is the camerawork, the editing and the moment-bymoment sequencing of each episode. The people responsible for these
aspects of the show have taken the fact that real time equals television
time and made it the basis for a new art form. The heroes of this
program are not Jack Bauer and David Palmer; they are the minute and
the second. Emblazoned on the screen at irregular intervals is a digital
∗
Professor of Law and Director of the Law Library, University of California Hastings College of the
Law. The author would like to thank Linda Weir, Vincent Moyer, Ruxana Meer, and Katie Wadell
for their exhaustive research assistance and enthusiastic support for this project. Further thanks go
to Reuel Schiller, Ed Symons, Welsh White, and George Grossman, for their insightful comments
on earlier drafts of this article. All these people have given of their time, the most precious gift.
1. Carlene Stephens, “The Most Reliable Time’’: William Bond, the New England Railroads,
and Time Awareness in 19th-Century America, 30 TECHNOLOGY & CULTURE 1, 23 (1989). “In
1839, Michel Chevalier preserved this telling self-evaluation of an unnamed American. . . .” Id.
2. Wendy Lesser, The Thrills, and the Chill, of ‘24’, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2002, § 2, at 27.
3. Id. at 37.
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clock that marks off the passing seconds, and every time we see it, our
anxiety ratchets up a notch. . . . The people and situations in “24” may
not reach out and grab us, but their clocks do, and as their lives tick
away in seconds, so must ours.4

Time5 may have become a television celebrity this season, but
telling time is something taken for granted by most people alive in 2002.
Telling time however, has not always been as easy, straightforward, and
mechanical, as it is today. By the late nineteenth century, there was
already sufficient conflict over how to tell time to force Americans to
litigate the subject. The courts wrestled with this dilemma while
legislatures reluctantly moved toward establishing a uniform method of
telling time. Congress did not act until 1918.6 Why did it take so long
to legally establish standard time in the United States? This article will
describe just how incredibly complex time determination has been in
human history. Focusing on the United States, 1870-1920, two theories
will be offered as to why American courts in at least sixteen cases were
left to struggle with inconsistent methods of telling time and why
Congress took so long to step into the fray and finally resolve the issue.7
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
In 1858, Curtis v. March8 was decided by Judge Frederick Pollock
in the Court of Exchequer.9 The defendant had failed to appear in court
at the Dorchester Assizes at 10:00 a.m. sharp and so the judge directed a
verdict for the plaintiff.10 The defendant’s attorney then entered the
4. Id.
5. Throughout this article there are so many descriptive adjectives preceding the word
“time” that it can become difficult to understand the exact reference. In general, sun time = solar
time = God’s time = true, real or apparent time. Opposing this, man-made time = clock time =
mean time. However, this is not an exact lexicon and some inconsistent usages are inevitable and
must be defined from context. Local time (also sometimes called mean time) is the time of a
particular geographical locality usually determined through mechanized means (as opposed to a
sundial). Standard time is the time for one of the earth’s 24 time zones; its creation and adoption is
a major subject of this article. Daylight saving time is an artificial determination of standard time
created to maximize the enjoyment of sunlight at certain times of the year; its creation and adoption
are a minor focus of this article.
6. An Act to Save Daylight and to Provide Standard Time for the United States, ch. 24, 40
Stat. 450-51 (March 19, 1918) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 261-64 (2002)). Daylight saving
time, a subject deserving of a separate article, was repealed a year later. An Act for the Repeal of
the Daylight-Saving Law, ch. 51, 41 Stat. 280 (August 20, 1919) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§
261-264 (2002)).
7. See infra notes 32-43 and accompanying text.
8. Curtis v. March, 157 Eng. Rep. 719 (Ex. Ch. 1858).
9. Id.
10. Id.
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court and demanded to have the cause tried.11 “At that time it wanted
one minute and a half to 10 by the town clock. The clock in court was
regulated by Greenwich time, which was some minutes before the true
time at Dorchester.”12 On appeal, Judge Pollock, writing for the court,
decided in favor of the defendant and the cause was tried.13 The holding
however is far less interesting than the court’s dicta.14
The difference between Greenwich time and the real time at Carlisle is
several minutes, and therefore if a town council might determine the
time, they might make a man born on a different day from that on
which he was really born. Or suppose that by act of parliament a
person was bound to go out of office on a particular day, the town
council by altering the time might put him out of office to-day instead
of to-morrow. So if a person is entitled to a bonus from an insurance
office in the event of his living to a certain period, that must be
decided, not by the town council adopting Greenwich time, but by the
mean time of the place. Ten o’clock is 10 o’clock according to the
time of the place, and the town council cannot say that it is not, but that
it is 10 o’clock by Greenwich time. Neither can the time be altered by
a railway company whose railway passes through the place, nor by any
person who regulates the clock in the town-hall.15

As innocent or impractical as this statement may sound, especially
to the twenty-first century ear, it reflects mid-nineteenth century England
which still ruled an empire and was a place where a person could look
up at the sun and ascertain the time without resort to any kind of
technology.16 It is particularly worth noting the disapproval of the
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. The American press would engage in similar musings on November 18, 1883, the
“day of two noons,” when American railroads adopted standard time. MICHAEL O’MALLEY,
KEEPING WATCH: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN TIME 123-130 (1990).
16. In truth however, railroads exercised far more influence than the judge wished to
recognize.
[T]he greatest push toward standardizing time reckoning at a supralocal level came from
the railroad world. If there was to be a single timetable for an entire railway system,
there was also a need for a single, uniform standard of time. . . . And, indeed, it was the
railroad timetable that was primarily responsible for making GMT the uniform standard
of time throughout Britain. . . . With the growing use of railroad transportation, many
cities soon followed the railroads’ example and by 1855, 98% of all public clocks in
Britain were already set to G[reenwich] M[ean] T[ime].
Eviatar Zerubavel, The Standardization of Time: A Sociohistorical Perspective, 88 AM. J. SOC. 1, 7
(1982), citing DEREK HOWSE, GREENWICH TIME AND THE DISCOVERY OF THE LONGITUDE 87-89,
105-14 (1980). Clark Blaise elaborates: “The first decade of standard time in Britain, the 1850s,
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notion that the railroad should have an influence on the determination of
the time of day, because in fact, ten years prior to this decision, in 1848,
“most British railroads had set their clocks to Greenwich, in defiance of
local time and tradition.”17 Critics had condemned this as “railway-time
aggression.”18 This was “‘usurping the power of the Allmighty.’ The
authority for time, be it Greenwich Observatory, the railroad, or God,
informed the principles, moral, economic, or otherwise, that governed
daily life.”19
The British case of Curtis v. March was the progenitor of a line of
court decisions in the United States debating the appropriate means of
telling time.20 In the period from 1880 to 1920, as the Victorian era gave
way to the modern era, complex technological forces21 transformed the
United States, and indeed the world.22 As one significant part of this
was Britain’s shining moment.” CLARK BLAISE, TIME LORD: SIR SANDFORD FLEMING AND THE
CREATION OF STANDARD TIME 19 (2000).
17. O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 71.
18. Id. The same criticism was leveled in the United States. “To allow the railroads to fix the
standard of time would be to allow them at pleasure to violate or defeat the law.” Henderson v.
Reynolds, 10 S.E. 734, 735 (Ga. 1889). See discussion of this case in text accompanying note 170.
See also the quotation from Tex. Tram & Lumber Co. v. Hightower, 96 S.W. 1071 (Tex. 1906) in
text and accompanying note 169.
19. O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 71, (quoting HOWSE, supra note 16, at 49-53) (footnote
omitted).
20. Curtis v. March, 157 Eng. Rep. 719 (Ex. Ch. 1858).
21. MARK M. SMITH, MASTERED BY THE CLOCK: TIME, SLAVERY, AND FREEDOM IN THE
AMERICAN SOUTH 90 (1997).
While the railroad compacted American space and time, the telegraph and steamship
were technological bedfellows in the quest for global compression. . . . The telegraph
especially was deemed to have tamed nature and, in the process, mastered time. . . . It
was actually independent of nature because it could function ‘‘at every hour of the day or
night, irrespective of weather.’’. . .
The ascendancy of telegraph time had the considerable effect of wrenching
Americans, southerners included, from local time into world time, telling them, as it
were, that they were part of a larger world market where time differences both separated
and united localities in a standard temporal universe. This was especially true after the
laying of the Atlantic telegraph cable in the late 1850s. . . .
Id. at 90.
22. JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND
PROGRESSIVISM IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1870-1920 152 (1986). “Technology
was transforming social structure and cultural values, but the shape of the society and culture that
would replace them remained shrouded in doubt.” Id. “From around 1880 to the outbreak of World
War I a series of sweeping changes in technology and culture created distinctive new modes of
thinking about experiencing time and space.” STEPHEN KERN, THE CULTURE OF TIME AND SPACE,
1880-1918 1 (1983). “[W]ho never wonders if the dangers of technological progress don’t
outweigh the benefits?” O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 308. ‘‘‘What people mean by the word
technology is the stuff that doesn’t really work yet.’’’ Technology is both the problem and its own
solution. No wonder it obsesses us.” STEWART BRAND, THE CLOCK OF THE LONG NOW: TIME AND
RESPONSIBILITY 16 (1999).
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transformation, people began to tell time differently and to focus on time
in a different way. Previously, the position of the sun reflected on a
sundial was sufficient to determine the time of day. But turn-of-thecentury Americans were increasingly focused on, and dependent on,
time, and so the usual approximation based on sun time was no longer
sufficient. Eventually clocks and watches became the convenient
substitute, but they all told different times because each was set based on
the sun time at the longitude for the location of the timepiece.
In 1883, a standard time was established by the railroads in the
United States,23 in conformity with a worldwide movement toward
standard time, i.e., a uniform common time for an identified
geographical area.24 Businesses generally adopted standard time and
eventually so did governmental entities.25 But legislatures were slow to
enact legislation formally setting standard time as every citizen’s
standard.26 The United States Congress did not adopt a standard time
23. Ian R. Bartky and Elizabeth Harrison, Standard and Daylight-saving Time, 240 SCI. AM.
46 (1979). “On November 18, 1883, most of the railroads in the U.S. and Canada began to operate
on Standard Railway Time, reducing the number of railroad times from at least 56 to four.” Id.
Chapter 3 of SMITH, supra note 21, is devoted to the interdependence of steamships, railways, the
telegraph and the postal service and their combined emphasis on punctuality.
24. In 1884 representatives of twenty-five countries that convened at the Prime
Meridian Conference in Washington proposed to establish Greenwich as the zero
meridian, determined the exact length of the day, divided the earth into twenty-four time
zones one hour apart, and fixed a precise beginning of the universal day. But the world
was slow to adopt the system, for all its obvious practicality.
....
The proponents of world time were few, and none of them . . . were well known
beyond the narrow circle of fellow reformers. Nevertheless the concept of public time
was widely accepted as a proper marker of duration and succession. There were no
elaborate arguments on its behalf because there seemed to be no need.
KERN, supra note 22, at 12, 15. For a wonderful, behind-the-scenes account of the Prime Meridian
Conference of 1884, see BLAISE, supra note 16, at 194 et seq.
25. Ian R. Bartky, The Adoption of Standard Time, 30 TECH. & CULTURE 25, 49-50 (1989).
“By April 1884 Allen was reporting that seventy-eight of the hundred principal American cities had
adopted the new time.” Id.
26. Not all states actually passed legislation controlling the use of standard time; some did but
incorporated the 1918 federal statute by reference. Those that did legislatively adopt standard time
include the following: ALA. CODE § 11 (1907), 1945 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 38, CAL. GOV’T CODE §
6807-2 (West 1995), COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2-4-109(1) (West 2000), CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4888
(1902), 1889 Fla. Laws ch. 3916, 1947 Haw. Sess. Laws 161, § 20.01, 1959 Ill. Laws § 1, 1929 Ind.
Acts ch. 103, 1965 Iowa Acts ch. 140, §§ 1, 2, 1868 Kan. Sess. Laws ch 25, § 172, 1931 Me. Acts
ch. 273, 1884 Md. Laws ch. 433, 1920 Mass. Acts. ch. 280, 1885 Mich. Pub. Acts 5, 1905 Minn.
Laws § 5514, 1974 Neb. Laws LB651, 1921 N.H. Laws ch. 15, 1884 N.J. Laws ch. CXIII, §§ 1, 2,
1884 N.Y. Laws ch. 14, § 5, 1927 Ohio Laws § 5979, 1961 Or. Laws ch. 417, 1887 Pa. Laws 18,
1946 R.I. Acts & Resolves ch. 1778, § 1, 1909 S.D. Laws ch. 46, § 1, 1949 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 5, §
1, 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 359, 1921 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 261, §§ 1, 2, VA. CODE ANN. § 115 (Michie 1950), 1953 Wash. Laws ch. 2, § 1, 1923 Wis. Laws ch. 244, § 1, 1884 Wyo. Sess. Laws
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until 1918 and then it was done in conjunction with daylight saving time
and justified as a war emergency measure.27 Daylight saving time was
repealed a year later,28 but the standard time system was retained. And
so, until 1918 the nation was faced with conflicting approaches for
telling time.
Numerous lawsuits in which time’s reckoning was an issue
occurred in part because there was so little legislation spelling out the
accepted way to tell time.29 The sixteen American appellate cases
analyzed below cover state court decisions and one federal court
decision involving parties in two states.30 They range from 1889-1924.
Most are civil actions; a few are criminal cases. In some, time
determination is crucial to the outcome; in others it is a tangential
matter.
A review of the parties’ arguments suggests the relevance of not
ch. 95, § 1. Most interesting of all, Congress passed An Act to Establish a Standard of Time in the
District of Columbia, ch. 12, 23 Stat. 4 (1884), 34 years prior to the passage of the national statute!
27. See 40 Stat. 450-451 (1918) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 261-64 (2002)).
28. An Act for the Repeal of the Daylight-Saving Law, ch. 51, 41 Stat. 280 (August 20, 1919)
(current version 15 U.S.C. §§ 261-64 (2002)). For a summary of the daylight saving enactments
and repeals in the twentieth century, see CARLENE E. STEPHENS, INVENTING STANDARD TIME
(1983).
29. Dan Thu Nguyen, The Spatialization of Metric Time: The Conquest of Land and Labour
in Europe and the United States, 1 TIME & SOCIETY 29, 33 (1992), citing HOWSE, supra note 16, at
121-126. “[B]y 1884, 85% of all US towns over 10,000 inhabitants were living on railway time.
Once again, as in England, legislation lagged behind practice: Congress did not pass an Act to
legalize standard time all over the United States until 1918.” Id. “The growth in railroad and
scientific circles of an interest in standard time met with no response in the legislative assemblies of
the country. The only real possibility of action seemed to be through the railroads, and here the
body most interested was the General Time Convention.” Robert E. Reigel, Standard Time in the
United States, 33 AM. HIST. REV. 84, 86 (1927). Sometimes the resistance to standard time seemed
to be both official and personal as with the mayor of Bangor, Maine, who vetoed an ordinance
calling for the adoption of standard time. “He declares that neither railroad laws nor municipal
regulation has power to change one of the immutable laws of God, that the hours of noon, sunrise
and sunset should occur at different periods of the day, at different localities upon the earth’s
surface.” RAILROAD GAZETTE (N.Y., Feb. 4, 1884).
30. The cases considered here include: Curtis v. March, 157 Eng. Rep. 719 (Ex. Ch. 1858);
Henderson v. Reynolds, 10 S.E. 734 (Ga. 1889); Searles v. Averhoff, 44 N.W. 872 (Neb. 1890);
Proctor Coal Co. v. Finley, 33 S.W. 188 (Ky. 1895); Parker v. State, 29 S.W. 480 (Tx. Crim. App.
1895); State v. Johnson, 77 N.W. 293 (Minn. 1898); Jones v. German Ins. Co. of Freeport, Il., 81
N.W. 188 (Iowa 1899); Rochester German Ins. Co. v. Peaslee Gaulbert Co., 87 S.W. 1115 (Ky. L.
Rptr. 1905); Orvik v. Casselman, 105 N.W. 1105 (N.D. 1905); Tex. Tram & Lumber Co. v.
Hightower, 96 S.W. 1071 (Tex. 1906); Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. David Moffat Co.,
154 F. 13 (2d Cir. 1907); Salt Lake City v. Robinson, 116 P. 442 (Utah 1911); Walker v. Terrell,
189 S.W. 75 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916); Bank of Fruitvale v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y., 170 P.
852 (Cal. App. 1917); Goodman v. Caledonian Ins. Co. of Scotland. Same v. Ins. Co. of State of
Pa., 118 N.E. 523 (N.Y. 1917); Briegel v. Day, 195 N.Y.S. 295 (N.Y. App. Div. 1922); Carroll v.
City of Bayonne, 124 A. 613 (N.J. 1924). Another time case not analyzed here was Meier v.
Phoenix Ins. Co., (unreported case decided in the Supreme Court of Ohio, April 4, 1902).
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only local conditions for each case but also a national struggle over
coming to terms with this new way of telling time. In a sense, the time
story follows the contours of the Legal Process Theory.31 Initially, time
was a private matter determined by each individual through reference to
natural clues. But as society grew and industrialization expanded,
individuals became more and more interdependent and conflicts
developed as to whose determination of time would rule group activity.32
Inevitably reference to the group’s decision-makers, judges, grew.
These judges struggled valiantly, trying to develop logical easy-tofollow guidelines so that Everyman would be able to determine what
time it was.33 Alas, this was easier said than done. One of society’s
most dominant members, the railroads, developed and adopted standard
time for its particularly important societal activity, transportation.34
Eventually, judges bowed to the necessity of ruling consistently with the
railroads’ decisions.35 Meanwhile legislatures, ever loath to enter the
private sphere, began to see that the determination of time could no
longer remain a private matter. Gradually a body of state law36 and,
eventually, federal law was adopted to regulate one more aspect of life
which had once been a private matter.37 True to the bureaucratic spirit
of the post-World War I era, a federal administrative agency, the
Interstate Commerce Commission, was placed in charge of making
standard time and daylight saving time work for all citizens.38
31. See generally, HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey
eds., 1994).
32. See id. at 1: “Here enters the most fundamental of the conditions of human society. In the
satisfaction of all their wants, people are continuously and inescapably dependent upon one
another. . . . It is most significantly true of the great range of wants which depend for their
satisfaction upon the division of labor.” Id.
33. Id. This is an example of what Hart & Sacks call “the principle of institutional
settlement”:
To leave decisions of these questions [of society’s common concerns] to the play of raw
force would defeat these purposes [i.e., to preserve society]. . . . The principle of
institutional settlement expresses the judgment that decisions which are the duly arrived
at result of duly established procedures of this kind ought to be accepted as binding upon
the whole society unless and until they are duly changed.
Id. at 4.
34. See infra text accompanying note 254 et seq.
35. As suggested in the discussion of the court cases, as time went on, judges did bow to the
inevitability of standard time. However, traces of resentment over “railway-time aggression”
lingered. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
36. See supra note 26, citing the state legislation on standard time.
37. See 40 Stat. 450-51 (1918) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 261-64 (2002)), repealed in
part by 41 Stat. 280-81 (1919) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 261-64 (2002)).
38. Id. See also William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Historical and Critical
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From a more historical perspective, establishing a uniform means of
telling time can be viewed as one of many social challenges faced in the
Progressive era. Early on, telling time had been a matter of private,
individual autonomy.39 But the industrialized setting of the early
twentieth century demanded social cohesion, conformity to group norms,
leading to efficiency.40 Because the executive and legislative branches
of government were not at their strongest in this period, by default the
judicial branch worked at resolving the conflict among all the different
time-telling techniques.41 By World War I, with the emergence of a
more active legislative branch, i.e., Congress, a legislative resolution
mandated one standard and uniform method for telling time.42
The period of 1870-1920 was a major transition period for the
western world, and especially the United States. It was a time of
Introduction, in The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law, supra
note 32, at lix-lxii, for a discussion of the growth of the administrative state from 1912 to 38.
“[J]udges are generalists. . .” Id. at lxi. Administrative agencies were better suited for
decisionmaking in areas requiring expertise. The growth of bureaucracy and administration was a
larger societal theme during the first decade or so of the twentieth century. See infra text
accompanying notes 314-17.
39. Still the most common explanations most Americans gave to political, economic,
and social questions at the end of the century were couched in terms of largely
autonomous individuals: poverty and success were said to hinge on character; the
economy was essentially a straight sum of individual calculations; governance was a
matter of good men and official honesty. Part of what occurred in the Progressive era
was a concerted assault on all these assumptions, and, in some measure, an assault on the
idea of individualism itself. . . . In its place, many of the progressives seized on a rhetoric
of social cohesion.
Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search of Progressivism, 10 REVIEWS IN AM. HIST. 113, 124 (1982).
40. “Like the language of antimonopolism, the language of social bonds focused its users’
anger on the irresponsible, antisocial act; but it directed its users’ longings not to honesty but to a
consciously contrived harmony.” Id. at 125.
41. ELDON J. EISENACH, THE LOST PROMISE OF PROGRESSIVISM 16 (1994).
At the national level, accommodating all of these competing interests was of such an
order of complexity—simply bargaining over tariffs became more than Congress could
handle by the early twentieth century—that major financial and industrial policies were
by default set in the federal courts. Indeed, at the beginning of this period, the power of
the president and the administrative capacity of the executive branch were so deficient
(and deliberately so, given the power of political parties) that even the generation and
diffusion of social and economic statistics were often beyond its level of competence.
Id.
42. That federal appellate courts regularly intervened in national regulation was less a
testimony to their autonomous power than to the incapacity of Congress to agree on clear
standards. Only in the decade preceding our entry into World War I and in the
bureaucratic legacy of that war can one discern “the creation of the American state” as
permanent and quasi-autonomous institutions.
Id. (citation omitted). For yet another view of this period, see STEPHEN SKOWRONEK,
BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE
CAPACITIES, 1877-1920 (1982).
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nervousness,43 a time of war, and a time when the pace of change was
involuntarily quickening. Whether the preoccupation with the exact
time in these court cases was the absolutely necessary part of doing
business in the now modern world, as asserted by the parties to the suits,
or whether it was simply “buncombe” as one judge44 described it, i.e.,
just an excuse to avoid contractual obligations, these decisions, reached
varying but arguably reconcilable results.
To the twenty-first century mind, time is money45 and so there is
huge concern regarding making the most of every waking moment.46
Many people maximize their waking moments by sleeping as little as
possible.47 The thought that one might not know down to the minute just
43. KERN, supra note 22, at 15:
Punctuality and the recording of work time did not originate in this period, but never
before had the temporal precision been as exact or as pervasive as in the age of
electricity. From the outset there were critics. Some pathological effects were noted in
that catalog of medical alarmism, George Beard’s American Nervousness. He blamed
the perfection of clocks and the invention of watches for causing nervousness wherein ‘a
delay of a few moments might destroy the hopes of a lifetime.’ Every glance at the
watch for these nervous types affects the pulse and puts a strain on the nerves. There
were many other alarmists who reacted adversely to the introduction of standard time,
but the modern age embraced universal time and punctuality because these served its
larger needs.
Id. The early twentieth century preoccupation with time and the nervousness, neurosis, anxiety, and
freneticism it brought on could be the subject of a separate article. A number of authors discuss
this; see RONALD TAKAKI, IRON CAGES: RACE AND CULTURE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA
165 (1979) (discussing GEORGE BEARD’S AMERICAN NERVOUSNESS (1881)); SMITH, supra note 21,
at 65-66 (nineteenth century merchants developed nervous disorders at the prospect of losing time),
and at 85 (indicating that freneticism and similar afflictions were the salient features of the post1830 South); O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 150 (discussing nervousness due to the emphasis on
punctuality), and at 158 (noting that teachers’ “nervous force” is saved by having clock-bound bells
to start/stop their classes); KERN, supra note 22, at 70 (citing a concern that reading many
newspapers, answering the phone, and thinking simultaneously about all five continents would lead
to “injury to the nerves.”) Multi-tasking was injurious before the concept was even invented!
44. State v. Johnson, 77 N.W. 293 (Minn. 1898). Judge Frank Ives, of Polk County,
Minnesota, made this assertion at trial as quoted in State v. Johnson, 77 N.W. 293, 294 (Minn.
1898): “I shall certainly deprive this defendant, and all others, of any such buncombe as this for a
defense.” Id. Justice Mitchell of the Minnesota Supreme Court commented: “There may be a
difference of opinion as to the good taste of this remark” but found it harmless. Id. The term
“buncombe” was quite popular in discussing time, as described by O’Malley, supra note 15, at 268:
“Most writers resented daylight saving as some sort of fakery, a sugar coating on the bitter pill of
morning. The Saturday Evening Post called it “a harmless piece of buncombe,” but asked
sarcastically “why not ‘save summer’ by having June begin at the end of February?”
45. Actually, this concept goes back to the mid-18th century. Benjamin Franklin, Poor
Richard’s Almanac, Jan. 1751, reprinted in THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, iv, 86-87
(Leonard W. Labaree, et al., eds.) (1961). Id.
46. See JAMES GLEICK, FASTER: THE ACCELERATION OF JUST ABOUT EVERYTHING 9 (1999)
(describing the malady as “hurry sickness”).
47. See id. at 121-25 (unnumbered chapter: “1,440 Minutes a Day,” noting the average person
sleeps only seven hours and eighteen minutes); DAVID LANDES, REVOLUTION IN TIME: CLOCKS
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what time it is strikes the driven, sleep-deprived, early twenty-first
century person as unthinkable.48 But ultimately time is an artificial
construct that has gone through many iterations in human history.49 One
cannot improve on St. Augustine’s statement of the dilemma: “What,
then, is time? If no one asks me, I know what it is. If I wish to explain
it to him who asks me, I do not know.”50
The next section will analyze the court cases for what they tell
about a society that gradually came to see some value in a standard time
system but was reluctant to legislate one formally.51 Then it is worth
AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 91 (1983) (discussing the fact that Petrarch hated sleep
because it reminded him of death); A. Roger Ekirch, Sleep We Have Lost: Pre-Industrial Slumber in
the British Isles, 106 AM. HIST. REV. 343 (2001) (arguing that the good old days weren’t); Verlyn
Klinkenborg, Awakening to Sleep, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 5, 1997, at 26 (discussing the
growing problem of sleep disorders); Facing Up to the Realities of Sleep Deprivation,” N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 31, 1998, at B13; Valerie Marchant, In the Deep of the Night, TIME MAGAZINE, Nov. 1, 1999,
(unnumbered pages) (noting that those who depart from the basic time clock pay a physiological
toll); Michael Castleman, Dead Tired, S. F. FOCUS, Oct. 1996, at 47 (noting that sleepiness has been
a major cause of catastrophe); Sue Shellenbarger, It’s the dawn of time for the sleep-deprived, S. F.
EXAMINER & CHRONICLE, Feb. 28, 1999, at CL31 (discussing that skimping on sleep can have
serious consequences); Nancy Ann Jeffrey, New Status Symbol: Eight Hours of Sleep,” S. F.
EXAMINER, Apr. 4, 1999, at C-14 (arguing that for many Americans a lack of sleep interferes with
their jobs, family duties and daily activities); David Tarrant, Z-Z Street, S. F. EXAMINER, Jan. 16,
2000, at J-1 (noting that a lack of sleep costs employers billions); Mary Williams Walsh, As
Overtime Rises, Fatigue Becomes a Labor Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2000, at 1, 28 (recognizing
the dangers of physical exhaustion). And for those not yet fatigued who need to know more, check
out http://www.sleepfoundation.org.
48. “The time-obsessed used to keep their watches accurate to within seconds; now they keep
their computers accurate to within milliseconds.” GLEICK, supra note 46, at 7. However, things
may be different in some places, for example, Indiana, “where a traditional agricultural economy
and a stubborn independence streak have kept daylight saving time at bay for decades.” Pam
Belluck, Indiana, Split by Time, Struggles Anew, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2001, at A1, A18.
49. “The history of American time shows that like other values we tend to take as eternal
certainties, time is for the most part a plastic, changeable notion, a social creation.” O’MALLEY,
supra note 15, at 312.
50. ST. AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS, Book XI, xiv, 17 at 230 (Henry Chadwick trans., Oxford
U. Press 1991) (397 A.D.) Anyone who writes seriously about time, quotes St. Augustine (though
too often without a footnote). Another interesting rumination from St. Augustine on this theme is:
“The present of things past is memory; the present of things present is sight; the present of things
future is expectation.” Id. Book XI, xx, 26 at 235, cited in Earl McKenzie, Time in European and
African Philosophy: A Comparison, 19 CARIBBEAN Q. 77, 78 (1973). Then again, St. Augustine did
not have access to THE AMERICAN & ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW (2d ed., 1905), 28:210, for
this definition of time: “[T]he system of those relations which any event has to any other, as past,
present, or future, and also as ‘the measure of duration.’”
51. There does not seem to be one answer to the question as to why legislation on standard
time was so slow in coming. O’Malley has stated: “Standard time, by 1900, was de facto law in
most urban places—unauthorized by statute but honored almost unthinkingly in practice.”
O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 192. However, he has also stated: “Time, after all, remained a fairly
hazy idea for most people, fraught with vaguely unsettling religious implications and perhaps better
left alone.” Id. at 99.
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considering how this country arrived at the point where one had to go to
court to decide what time it was.52 For this, the rather untidy history of
the process by which each human marks his/her progress on the
continuum from birth to death (the ultimate point of telling time)53 will
be summarized.54 While it was not just an American phenomenon,
particular emphasis will be given to the uniquely American historical
setting for these cases. Finally, the federal legislation of 191855
establishing standard time nationwide will be considered.56 This event
brought to formal conclusion the struggle of sun time versus clock time,
but only for a moment, and it marked the commencement of the more
sophisticated twentieth century struggle over daylight saving time.
III. THE COURT CASES
The litigation challenging the use of standard time or solar time
falls into several categories: four fire insurance cases where the insured
property has been destroyed just before or just after the expiration date
of the policy depending upon which interpretation of time was used,57
and one case involving insurance against robbery at a bank where the
robbery’s time of occurrence (mean or solar) determined coverage.
There are three liquor license cases where the bar owner’s license was
revoked because of a violation of the time limit for selling alcohol and
the defense was that the authorities were enforcing a different time than
the barkeep. In three cases juries returned verdicts just before or just
after midnight (depending on whether solar or standard time was used)
on a Saturday night. In two of the three cases, it was the last day of the
court term, so that if it was deemed to be after midnight, they were both
violating the Sabbath and turning in a verdict after the court’s term
ended. Three cases fit no particular category. The last two cases,
decided in 1922 and 1924, have to do with the use of daylight saving
time versus standard time. All these cases are American, and all but one
were decided in state courts. But the grandparent of all of them, and one

52. See infra notes 218-66 and accompanying text.
53. “American folklore linked clocks with mortality and the linear brevity of life.”
O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 33.
54. See infra notes 218-66 and accompanying text.
55. See 40 Stat. 450-51 (1918) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 261-64 (2002)), repealed in
part by 41 Stat. 280-81 (1919) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 261-64 (2002)).
56. See infra notes 326-52 and accompanying text.
57. Probably the most interesting aspect of these cases, and something never addressed, was
the insured’s intention with regard to renewing the insurance policy or obtaining a new policy from
a different insurer.
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oft-cited, is the British case, Curtis v. March, decided in 1858.58
Curtis v. March, deserves further serious attention, even if it was
often dismissed by American jurists, for what it says in dicta regarding
the way judges grappled with the dilemma of two time systems.59
Whether American judges agreed with the decision or not, its
commentary on how time was to be determined would echo across the
Atlantic.
In the mid-nineteenth century, even earlier than 1858, Americans
were having their own difficulties telling time. Michael O’Malley, in his
book, Keeping Watch, relays the story of the election controversy in
Pottsville, Pennsylvania, a mining town, in 1843.60 The polls were
supposed to close at 7:00 p.m., but some people were seen voting as late
as 8:20.61 A follow-up investigation revealed that the numerous sources
of the time used in the town could result in differences of up to an hour,
depending on whose timepiece was relied upon.
Who owned the most reliable watch? Whose clock told the correct
time? In Pottsville, with no agreed-upon standard, it was impossible to
tell.
These men objected to being victimized by an arbitrary standard of
time-a time derived from clocks they couldn’t verify or control. Since
watches were still too expensive for most people, the sun offered an
indisputable standard honored by tradition and religious authority, free
from the owner’s influence.62

Consistent with Curtis v. March, until the 1880s American cases
tended to be decided in favor of solar time reckoning. Thereafter,
because of the influence of the railroads and the standard time zones
they had adopted, standard time gradually became the legislatively
established norm for governmental bodies.63 As a consequence, many
court rulings began to apply standard time in other circumstances.
However, as seen below, there were some variations from this theme.64

58. See Curtis v. March, 157 Eng. Rep. 719 (Ex. Ch. 1858) and text accompanying note 8,
supra, for a brief description of the case.
59. Id.
60. O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 40-41.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 41.
63. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
64. It is reasonable to assume that a vast number of American cases were filed, and even went
to trial, where a major issue was which method of determining time would prevail. The sixteen
cases considered here are those appealed to higher courts.
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In Jones v. German Insurance Company of Freeport, Illinois,65 the
plaintiff had a fire insurance policy on his property that was in effect for
one year, expiring at “twelve o’clock at noon” on 18 September 1896.66
A fire broke out destroying the property at 11:45 a.m. sun or common
time, which was 12:02 1/2 standard time.67 Was the property covered
under the policy or had the policy expired? Did common time or
standard time rule? The Court affirmed the ruling below that common
or sun time ruled,68 discussing and quoting extensively from Henderson
v. Reynolds69 and Searles v. Averhoff.70 “Time, when it concerns a legal
duty, should be fixed with reference to a certain unvarying, uniform
standard, and that standard in this state, is the meridian of the sun.”71
But Jones, decided in 1899, was the only one of the four fire insurance
cases favoring the use of solar time.
Rochester German Insurance Co. v. Peaslee Gaulbert Co.72
involved a fire insurance policy with a term from 1 April 1901, noon, to
1 April 1902, noon.73 A fire started in a Louisville, Kentucky factory
building at about 11:45 a.m., standard time, on 1 April 1902.74 The
alarm was turned in at the fire department of the city at 11:59 a.m.,
standard time.75 11:45 a.m. standard time was 12:02 1/2 solar time.76
The building’s owners insisted that standard time was in common usage
and was what they meant when they signed the contract.77 The
insurance company insisted that solar time was meant.78 The court
affirmed the judgment below in favor of plaintiffs, supporting the use of
standard time, but ordered a new trial on a question of insurance
liability.79 The court stated: “To know the time, and to act upon the
65. Jones v. German Ins. Co. of Freeport, Ill., 81 N.W. 188 (Iowa 1899).
66. Id. at 189.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 190.
69. Henderson v. Reynolds, 10 S.E. 734 (Ga. 1889).
70. Searles v. Averhoff, 44 N.W. 872 (Neb. 1890).
71. Jones, 81 N.W. at 190.
72. Rochester German Ins. Co. v. Peaslee Gaulbert Co. 87 S.W. 1115 (Ky. 1905).
73. Id. at 1116.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1119. “In the Rochester German Insurance Company Case the further question
arises, when must the loss occur?” Id. In the court below, the answer was that if the destruction of
the warehouse was inevitable by noon then the policy covers it. Id. The appellate court says there
can be a big fire of several adjacent buildings in an area that can go on for days and it is unfair to
say that because destruction of a particular building is ascertainable on Monday that it is covered by
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means of such knowledge as if it were a practical certainty, is of the first
importance in most of the transactions of daily life.”80
The third fire insurance case was the 1907 federal court case of
Globe & Rutgers Fire Insurance Company of New York v. David Moffat
Company,81 in which a New York insurance company insured a tannery
located in Virginia for one year, expiring at noon on 8 January 1902.82
The fire started between 11:20 and 11:30 a.m. that day, although exactly
when the destruction of the insured property occurred varies with
whether solar time or standard time is used.83 The court ordered a new
trial because of a number of questions, including the fact that they could
not determine whether standard time or solar time was in common usage
in Iron Gate, Virginia, the location of the insured property.84 “If the
contract were one to be performed here [i.e., New York], the answer
would be easy,” stated the court citing the 1892 New York state law
adopting standard time for all legal and official proceedings in that
state.85 “Business in this city [New York City] has conformed itself to
this regulation so universally that this court will take judicial notice of
existing conditions.”86 But regarding what was meant, standard or solar
time, in Iron Gate, “we do not pass upon it now, because there will have
to be a new trial, and the testimony then presented may not be precisely
the same.”87
The fourth fire insurance case was Goodman v. Caledonian
Insurance Company of Scotland.88 The inventory in plaintiff’s clothing
store located in Buffalo was insured by defendant for the term of 29 July
1913 at noon, to 29 July 1914 at noon.89 The issue in this case as in the
three preceding cases was whether the fire occurred before or after noon
and whether solar time or standard time was to be used to determine
noon.90 The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff based on sun time
but the appeals court reversed and ordered a new trial stating that a 1909
the policy expiring at noon on Monday even if the big fire does not actually reach it until Friday—
that goes too far. Id.
80. Id. at 1117.
81. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. David Moffat Co., 154 F. 13 (2d Cir. 1907).
82. Id. at 14.
83. Id. at 14, 20.
84. Id. at 21-22.
85. Id. at 20.
86. Id. at 21.
87. Id.
88. Goodman v. Caledonian Ins. Co. of Scotland. Same v. Ins. Co. of State of Pa. 118 N.E.
523 (N.Y. 1917).
89. Id. at 523.
90. Id.
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New York law made standard time applicable.91 While the jury had
found that the policies were in force when the fire began, the judge may
have erroneously instructed the jury with regard to sun/standard time.92
Therefore a new trial was ordered in which it was to be made clear to the
jury that standard time controlled.93
Bank of Fruitvale v. Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York94
involved an Oakland, California, bank that had taken out an insurance
policy against inside or outside robbery.95 The hours covered under the
policy were 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday to Friday, and up to 8:30
p.m. on Saturdays.96 On Saturday evening, February 21, 1914, $2,300
was stolen at 8:34 p.m. standard time, 8:25 p.m. mean time.97 Time was
not the only contentious issue here.98 The policy required that a guard
be present at all times, yet the guard had inexplicably walked away at
8:15 p.m., mean time.99 Also, the bank-plaintiff had not read its policy
carefully and thought the coverage extended to 9:00 p.m., its time of
closing.100 The court held in favor of defendant insurance company on
all issues.101 With regard to time, standard time was actually mentioned
in the contract to determine the beginning and ending dates and times of
the insurance policy and so it was only logical that it should control as to
time of coverage. “Section 1875 of the Code of Civil Procedure
enumerates ‘the measure of time’ as one of the facts of which courts take
judicial notice; and since the year 1883 standard or railroad time has
been uniformly recognized and adopted as the measure of time in this
state.”102
One interpretation of these five cases is that they conform to the
“construction against drafter” rule of contract law where ambiguity
exists.103 “It is a general rule of interpretation that an expression is to be
interpreted most strongly against the party responsible for its
drafting. . . . The rule finds frequent application in cases dealing with
insurance contracts or other contracts containing standardized (printed)
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
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terms.”104 In the 1917 Fruitvale Bank case, there was considerably less
room for arguing ambiguity of terms because standard time had
specifically been mentioned elsewhere in the contract and standard time
was in general use in California by that date.
Another interpretation of these five cases is that the earliest, Jones,
decided in 1899, is the only one in which solar time prevailed,
principally because the use of standard time was not then so widespread.
The other three cases, all occurring after the turn of the century (1905,
1907, 1917) show an increasing acceptance of standard time, particularly
in the two cases where New York state statutes are cited as either
persuasive (the 1907 federal case) or dispositive (the 1917 New York
state court case). The increasing popular acceptance of standard time
eventually led to passage of the national law in 1918.105 But these
straightforward explanations for the resolution of casualty and theft
insurance disputes do not work so well for the liquor license cases.
In 1878, a Minnesota law was passed stating that establishments
selling intoxicating liquors must close by 11 p.m. In 1889, the statute
was reenacted with amendments but retained the 11 p.m. closing time.
According to the court in State v. Johnson,106 “[i]n 1883, the railroads of
the United States and Canada adopted four kinds of standard time, viz.
Eastern, Central, Mountain, and Pacific, each applicable to a region
covering approximately 15 deg. of longitude; in each case the standard
being actual sun time at the central degree of longitude of the region to
which the particular standard time was applicable.”107 In 1898, the
defendant was convicted of keeping his saloon open after 11:00.108 He
claimed it was 6 minutes before 11:00 sun time when he closed.109
Neither the trial court nor the state supreme court was persuaded.110 The
trial judge stated: “I shall certainly deprive this defendant, and all others,
of any such buncombe as this for a defense.”111 In response to the
defendant’s claim that such a statement was prejudicial error, the
supreme court stated: “There may be a difference of opinion as to the
good taste of this remark . . . [b]ut we fail to see how the remark could
have prejudiced the defendant, when made merely with reference to a
104. Id.
105. See 40 Stat. 450-51 (1918) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 261-64 (2002)), repealed in
part by 41 Stat. 280-81 (1919) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 261-64 (2002)).
106. State v. Johnson, 77 N.W. 293 (Minn. 1898).
107. Id. at 294.
108. Id. at 293.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 294.
111. Id.
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legal proposition, with which the jury had nothing to do.”112
It is worth noting that while this 1898 Minnesota trial judge
described the solar versus standard time conflict as “buncombe,”
something trivial, inconsequential, the popular mindset in 1898 was far
different.113 People really did want to know with certainty what time it
was, and, notwithstanding a statute applicable to a specific business, the
average late-nineteenth-century American viewed sun time as the
general standard.
No court took the matter of sun or standard time more seriously
than the Utah Supreme Court in the 1911 case of Salt Lake City v.
Robinson.114 The defendant was convicted of violating a Salt Lake City
ordinance prohibiting the sale of liquor on Sunday or between 12
midnight and 6 a.m.115 Defendant had sold beer at 20 or 25 minutes
after midnight standard time but just before midnight solar time in Salt
Lake City.116 The court decided that the City Council had mountain
standard time in mind when it passed the ordinance and so the court
upheld the defendant’s conviction on what was a quasi-criminal
ordinance.117 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Straup maintained that in
the case of an ambiguity in an ordinance, the case should be construed in
favor of the person charged with violating the ordinance.118 He also
objected to the fact that the court did not give the jury an instruction
regarding the determination of solar or standard time and which time
system was to be used in determining the defendant’s guilt or
innocence.119 Among the court opinions considered, this is one of the
longer ones with elaborate examination of precedents, and yet the facts
seem simple and straightforward.120
The opinion is notable for its length. There may be reasons for this
that are not readily apparent today. In particular, the conflict between
standard and solar time was reaching some kind of turning point by
1911, and the Robinson court may not only have felt compelled to be
very explicit in its reasoning but also may have hoped to establish
guiding precedent, settling the matter for other state court brethren.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Salt Lake City v. Robinson, 116 P. 442 (Utah 1911).
115. Id. at 443.
116. Id. at 444.
117. Id. at 443-44.
118. Id. at 447 (Straup, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 448.
120. The briefs, which examine the precedents and facts, are no longer available for Salt Lake
City v. Robinson.
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The third liquor license case is another long opinion, full of
extensive quotations from testimony given in the trial court, as well as
citations to, and discussion of, other solar versus standard time cases
(though neither Johnson nor Robinson is mentioned). Walker v.
Terrell121 involved revocation of a liquor dealer’s license because he
violated the law which required that liquor not be sold after 9:30 p.m. or
before 6 a.m. and not at all on Sunday.122 Again the issue was whether
solar or standard time controlled.123 The trial court held in favor of
standard time and upheld defendant’s conviction.124 But the appeals
court applied the use of solar time and remanded the case for a new trial,
even though the time issue was not raised in appellant barkeep’s
pleadings.125
The first two liquor license cases may simply reflect the long
established rule that “localities have unquestioned power to regulate the
sale and distribution of liquor-not only for protection of morality, but
also for health and safety purposes.”126 They also reflect the rule
suggested earlier127 that the closer in time to the end of World War I and
the adoption of standard time by the federal government,128 the more
likely the case was to be decided in favor of standard time. The third
liquor license case, a 1916 Texas case, is the anomaly.129 Without the
briefs, it is difficult to be certain why the appellate court decided in favor
of solar time.
The last cohesive group of cases is the three “jury verdict at
midnight” cases. The first was Henderson v. Reynolds,130 where the jury
began to deliberate at 8:00 p.m. on Saturday night.131 Shortly before
12:00 midnight the judge asked the sheriff to see if the jury was likely to
agree on a verdict before midnight.132 The sheriff reported that they

121. Walker v. Terrell, 189 S. W. 75 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916); briefs no longer available.
122. Id. at 76.
123. Id. at 80.
124. Id.
125. Id.: (“[R]egardless of whether the question was raised by the pleadings in the trial court,
that court’s ruling upon it is subject to review in this court.”).
126. OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., HANDBOOK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 634 (2d ed.
2001).
127. See supra text and accompanying note 105.
128. See 40 Stat. 450-51 (1918) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 261-64 (2002)), repealed in
part by 41 Stat. 280 (1919) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 261-64 (2002)).
129. Walker, 189 S.W.75 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
130. Henderson v. Reynolds, 10 S.E. 734 (Ga. 1889).
131. Id. at 734.
132. Id.
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were not.133 The judge then informed the jury that because they had not
reached a verdict they would have to stay overnight and throughout
Sunday, could not discuss the case, and could eat only at their own
expense.134 The jury was sent back to the jury room and a few minutes
later announced that they had reached a verdict.135 A motion for new
trial was made on numerous grounds.136 The eighth ground was
essentially that starving the jury was not the appropriate way to ensure a
speedy verdict.137 “The ninth and tenth grounds complain that the
verdict was made and returned on Sunday.”138 Therefore the issue of
solar or standard time came directly into play.
On appeal, the court found that such captivity of the jurors was
error and a new trial should have been granted.139 “It may have been
that the very jurors who were holding out against the proposed verdict
were unable to pay for their meals, and therefore agreed to the verdict,
rather than go without food until the court should meet again, the next
Monday morning.”140 The court also spent considerable time on the
argument that the verdict was made and returned on Sunday.141 The
judge ran the court on railroad time and so it was midnight when the
verdict was announced, which was 12:20 a.m. solar time.142 While the
Georgia Supreme Court did not agree with running the court on railroad
(i.e., standard) time, it did think that common sense and respect for the
Sabbath required this judge to accept the verdict even if it was past
midnight rather than to delay until Monday morning.143
The second jury verdict time case is Parker v. State144 where the
defendant was found guilty of murder.145 The defendant claimed that the
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 734-35.
142. Id. at 734.
143. Id. at 735.
It was much better to receive this verdict upon Sunday morning than to keep 12 jurors,
and the officers attending them, confined in a room throughout the Sabbath and for
nearly 36 hours. It was an act of charity and of necessity to receive this verdict, so that
the jurors could return to their homes for rest and refreshment during the night, and, if
they so desired, could attend public worship during the day.
Id.
144. Parker v. State, 29 S.W. 480 (Tex. Crim. App. 1895).
145. Id.
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jury verdict was null because it was rendered after the expiration of the
court term at midnight on the Saturday of the last week of the term.146
The defendant contended that standard time should govern; the court
was run on solar time measured by the courthouse clock, by which time
the verdict was rendered before midnight on Saturday, May 14, 1892.147
However, witnesses testified that the courthouse clock had been set to a
sundial several weeks before and had been losing time since.148 Their
watches, set to standard time, showed that the verdict was handed down
at 12:46 a.m. on Sunday, May 15, 1892.149 Said the court:
We think that the testimony fairly shows that the verdict was received
by the court from 12 to 16 minutes before 12 o’clock, and that the
sentence was pronounced on defendant from 5 to 10 minutes before 12
o’clock, on Saturday night, the 14th of May, 1892, by the courthouse
clock.150

The court further stated regarding the witnesses who testified as to
what their own watches said: “They, too, fail to depreciate their watches
as being otherwise than good timekeepers.”151 The court adopted true
sun time as controlling here even though admitting that the issue had
never before been determined in Texas.152 They cited Henderson v.
Reynolds153 and Searles v. Averhoff154 with approval.155
The third case is Texas Tram & Lumber Co. v. Hightower,156 a writ
of mandamus action to compel the judge to enter the verdict found at
trial.157 In 1901, the Texas and New Orleans Railroad Company brought
an action of trespass to try title against the Texas Tram & Lumber
Company to recover a parcel of land in the city of Beaumont, Texas.158
The jury retired to consider its verdict at 8:00 p.m. on Saturday, May 26,
1906, the last day of the court’s term.159 “Before the court was
adjourned by the presiding judge at 3 minutes past 12 by railroad time,

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
Id. at 480-81.
Id. at 481.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Henderson v. Reynolds, 10 S.E. at 734 (Ga. 1889).
Searles v. Averhoff, 44 N.W. 872 (Neb. 1890).
Parker, 29 S.W. at 481.
Tex. Tram & Lumber Co. v. Hightower, 96 S.W. 1071 (Tex. 1906).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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which was at least 15 minutes before 12 p.m. by sun time, the jury came
into court and returned a verdict in favor of [Tram]. . . .”160 The
Railroad immediately moved for a new trial stating that the verdict had
come too late, relying on railroad or standard time.161 The trial judge,
L.B. Hightower, agreed and “determined as a matter of law that the
adjournment was controlled by the railroad time, and that the verdict
came too late.”162 The Texas Supreme Court reversed, citing with
approval Curtis v. March,163 Henderson v. Reynolds,164 Searles v.
Averhoff,165 Parker v. State,166 and Rochester Insurance Co. v. Peaslee
Gaulbert Co.167 The court reasoned:
The railroad time for the section in which Texas is included is not the
true time for the particular locality, but the St. Louis time; so that the
proposition resolves itself into saying that because the people at
Beaumont have adopted in the conduct of their affairs the St. Louis
time, when the Legislature declared that the April term of the Sixtieth
Judicial District should continue ‘until and including the last Saturday
in May,’ the end of the day should be determined by the St. Louis time,
and not by the true time, namely, ‘the mean solar time.’ It seems to us
the proposition so stated carries with it its own refutation.168

Once again, a court unequivocally stated that, while the railroad time
may be fine for the railroad and for businesses in general, it would not
control the court’s affairs.
While each court’s stand on solar time versus standard time
undoubtedly played its part in the determination of these three cases, an
alternative explanation may simply be that judicial efficiency demanded
that the verdicts of these juries be accepted whether they were
technically delivered on time or not. To hold these jurors for a day or
more, especially on the Sabbath, would have been unreasonable in the
circumstances and a waste of the court’s time and money.
The next three cases have no single organizing principle. Searles v.
Averhoff169 was in some respects the American version of Curtis v.

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 1071-72.
Curtis v. March, 157 Eng. Rep. 719 (Ex. Ch. 1858).
Henderson v. Reynolds, 10 S.E. 734 (Ga. 1889).
Searles v. Averhoff, 44 N.W. 872 (Neb. 1890).
Parker v. State, 29 S.W. 480 (Tex. Crim. App. 1895).
Rochester German Ins. Co. v. Peaslee Gaulbert Co., 87 S.W. 1115 (Ky. 1905).
Tex. Tram. & Lumber Co. v. Hightower, 96 S.W. 1071, 1072 (Tex. 1906).
Searles v. Averhoff, 44 N.W. 872 (Neb. 1890).
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March,170 and is often cited for its pro-solar time outcome. The
defendant was summoned to appear before a justice of the peace at 10
a.m. to defend an action on a promissory note.171 The defendant did not
appear.172 The justice of the peace waited one hour standard time and
then rendered a default judgment against the defendant.173 Before 11
a.m., common time, the defendant appeared and asked to present his
defense but was refused.174 The defendant then took the case on error to
the district court where the decision of the justice of the peace was
reversed.175 The supreme court affirmed.176
Standard time, however, in Franklin county, where this case was tried,
is about half an hour faster than common time. Whether standard time
is generally in use in the courts of that place does not appear. The
presumption is that common time is that relied upon where there is
nothing to show that a different mode of measuring time has been in
general use. Where, therefore, the return of a summons is to be made
at an hour named, standard time, the summons should so state.
Otherwise it will be presumed that common time was intended.177

Given the early time frame (1890) of this case, its pro-solar time stance
is not surprising.
Proctor Coal Company v. Finley,178 was brought to enjoin
defendants from interfering with plaintiffs in the management of a
Kentucky coal company.179 A stockholder meeting was held in
Louisville involving two factions of stockholders.180 The meeting was
set for 4:00 p.m. but one faction insisted on starting it at 4:00 sun time
which came 18 minutes before 4:00 standard time.181 Business in
Louisville was generally conducted on standard time and so numerous
local stockholders had not yet appeared.182 Consequently, after protest
from the other Louisville faction, it was agreed to start the meeting and
the vote at 4:00 standard time.183 Because of this accommodation, the
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Curtis v. March, 157 Eng. Rep. 719 (Ex. Ch. 1858).
Searles v. Averhoff, 44 N.W. 873 (Neb. 1890).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Proctor Coal Co. v. Finley, 33 S.W. 188 (Ky. 1895).
Id.
Id. at 189.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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state supreme court found the time issue irrelevant, or at least
Although time
unimportant to a determination of the case.184
determination was ultimately not an issue, the court affirmed that
standard time was the “proper time.”185
In the 1905 North Dakota case of Orvik v. Casselman,186 the
defendant appealed from a judgment for plaintiffs in an action to quiet
title.187 Plaintiffs bought land after the mortgage of the previous owner
was foreclosed.188 Defendant attacked the sale because of insufficient
publication of the foreclosure notice and because the sale was conducted
28 minutes before the time stated in the notice.189 The sale was to be
held at 2:00 p.m.190 Standard time was 28 minutes faster than sun time
and defendant contended that sun time should govern.191 The Court held
otherwise, stating that standard time has “been in universal usage in this
state since territorial times. The court takes judicial notice of that
usage.”192 The court went further and distinguished Henderson,193
Searles,194 and Jones,195 stating that they had no bearing on the case
because standard time had not been adopted by usage in those states at
the time of the decisions.196
The final category of cases occurred after passage of the federal
statute adopting standard time and daylight saving time.197 In the first of
the two cases, Briegel v. Day,198 decided in New York in 1922, the
question before the court concerned the service of a summons and
complaint according to daylight saving time instead of standard time.199
The court upheld use of daylight saving time, which was authorized
under state statute and had become a part of standard time in New

184. Id. at 191.
185. Id.
186. Orvik v. Casselman, 105 N.W. 1105 (N.D. 1905).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1105-06.
193. Henderson v. Reynolds, 10 S.E. 734 (Ga. 1889).
194. Searles v. Averhoff, 44 N.W. 872 (Neb. 1890).
195. Jones v. German Ins. Co. of Freeport, Il., 81 N.W. 188 (Iowa 1899).
196. Orvik, 105 N.W. at 1106.
197. See 40 Stat. 450-51 (1918) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 261-64 (2002)), repealed in
part by 41 Stat. 280 (1919) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 261-64 (2002)). See also O’MALLEY,
supra note 15, at 259 et seq. for a history of the passage of daylight saving time.
198. Briegel v. Day, 195 N.Y.S. 295 (N.Y. App. Div. 1922).
199. Id. at 296.
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York.200
In the second daylight saving time case, Carroll v. City of
Bayonne,201 decided in New Jersey in 1924, a new board of
commissioners was to take over at noon on May 15, 1923.202 The old
board had made a number of last minute appointments to the police and
fire departments which the new board decided to rescind.203 The new
board started its meeting at 12:03 daylight saving time, 11:03 standard
time.204 The issue was whether their action was timely.205 The court
decided that their actions had no validity because standard time ruled
and therefore the commissioners were not yet officially in office when
they made the rescissions.206 The court did state that the rescission
“might have been vitalized by re-enactment, but no such course was
taken.”207 Judicial efficiency was posited as one interpretation for the
verdict-at-midnight cases discussed earlier.208 Judicial inefficiency
seems an equally plausible interpretation for this case.
In a time when litigation was not yet as prevalent as it is today,209
and certainly taking cases on appeal was not business as usual, what
might prompt such litigation? Often the outcomes depended upon the
timing of each particular case, with the later cases favoring standard time
as the country moved in that direction in a legislative and commercial
way. O’Malley has suggested that the states in which these cases were
tried were “hotbeds of rural radicalism and Populist support.”210 The
Populists “rejected the kind of linear, ‘industrial’ time implicit in the
new standards.”211 “Populist writings insisted on nature as the source of
time and natural imperatives as guides to using it.”212 It was not that the
200. Id. at 297.
201. Carroll v. City of Bayonne 124 A. 613 (N.J. 1924).
202. Id. at 614.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. The court held that they were bound by 4 N.J. Comp. St. 1910, at 4879, establishing
standard time for all official functions in New Jersey. Id.
207. Id.
208. See supra text and accompanying notes 130-68.
209. J. MYRON JACOBSTEIN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 12 (7th ed. 1998).
“During the period from 1658 to 1896 American courts reported 500,000 decisions, and by 1990
there were 4,000,000 reported decisions. . . . it is estimated that over 140,000 cases are now
published annually.” Id.
210. O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 140. Most of the post-1900 cases took place in the
midwest, the stronghold of Progressivism, the reform movement that followed Populism. See
EISENACH, supra note 41, at 68.
211. O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 140.
212. Id. at 141.
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Populists objected to “machinery-or clocks, or industry, or the railroadsas to the ideas and assumptions about time and progress that governed
them.”213 In the 1880s, standard time represented something unnatural,
and therefore wrong, to them, and they would have the same reaction to
daylight saving time in the immediate post-World War I era.214
In all of these cases, other factors and other issues of law weighed
as heavily, and often more heavily, than the issue of time’s reckoning.
What is remarkable to the modern mind is that time determination was
an issue at all. In a number of these cases, it is probably fair to suggest
that the solar/standard time conflict was a last ditch effort to win the
case, just “buncombe” as it was characterized in State v. Johnson.215
How did mankind move from prehistoric time where one
presumably determined time by looking at the sun to the early twentieth
century where one looked to the Interstate Commerce Commission for
guidance on the time zone in which he lived? Again, it is important to
state the two overarching themes: the legal and the historical.
From a legal perspective, the Legal Process Theory was playing
itself out.216 Time determination started as a private matter, became a
group concern, ultimately required the intervention of society’s
arbitrators, the courts, to settle disputes about whose time was the
correct time, and finally was settled by the national legislative body, the
Congress, who delegated the actual implementation of time zones to an
administrative body, the Interstate Commerce Commission.
From a historical perspective, the Progressive era in the United
States was the perfect setting for the regularization of time.217 The
modern, industrial era required that citizens know the time in order to
get on with the rest of their increasingly busy lives. Before World War
I, courts had ascended to the dominant position among the three
branches of federal government and echoing this, state courts had
stepped up and tried to resolve time discrepancies among citizenlitigants. Finally, Congress took the reins and established standard time
for all the United States.
While the legal viewpoint and the historical backdrop of the turnof-the-twentieth-century era are critical to understanding what happened

213. Id.
214. Id. See infra text and accompanying note 299 (discussing populism).
215. State v. Johnson, 77 N.W. 293, 294 (Minn. 1898).
216. See supra text and accompanying notes 31-38 for an explanation of the Legal Process
Theory.
217. See supra text and accompanying notes 39-42 for a summary of the time determination
quest and how it fit in to the American state building of the Progressive era.
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with time determination in America, they do not go to the deeper
historical, psychological, sociological and emotional roots that run
barely submerged under all efforts at telling time. To fully understand
what this is all about, that story must be told.
IV. TIME AND HOW IT CAME TO BE218
Early man’s preoccupation with sustaining his own life and not
becoming dinner for the prehistoric animals and other humans who
roamed the earth precluded serious consideration of matters related to
time.219 As survival issues came under better control, man had the
opportunity to ponder the sun during the day and the moon at night, as
well as the change of seasons and its impact on the length of the day.
When man began to engage in agricultural activities, these time-related
aspects of nature took on new meaning and importance. Not only did he
begin to count the days of the growing and harvest seasons, he became
concerned about counting the days of his own lifespan. He was close to
nature and nature is very much about time.220
218. This is an enormously complex topic spanning all human history. For a surprisingly
thorough, if necessarily shallow, overview of 580 years of time history, see Nigel Thrift, Owners’
Time and Own Time: The Making of a Capitalist Time Consciousness, 1300-1880, in LUND
STUDIES IN GEOGRAPHY SERIES B HUMAN GEOGRAPHY NO. 48, 56 (1981).
219. Actually, there are competing ideas about this statement. “Time and its measurement
have been preoccupations of mankind since the most primitive civilization in all parts of the world,
and as his needs and his knowledge increased, so did man’s awareness and concepts of time
develop. . . .” S.E. Bedini, Oriental Concepts of the Measure of Time, STUDY OF TIME II 451
(1975). Further discussion of the nature of primitive man’s time consciousness can be found in A.J.
Gurevich, Time as a Problem of Cultural History, CULTURES AND TIME 229 (1976). But many
believe that knowing the time down to the minute is a much more recent preoccupation in the
history of mankind. Matteo Ricci, the Jesuit, introduced clocks to China upon his arrival in 1577
but the Chinese showed no particular interest in adopting Western clock technology. Why the lack
of interest? According to David Landes, “it was simply not important in China to know the time
with any precision. Calendar dates mattered, but neither life nor work had ever been organized on
the basis of hours and minutes.” LANDES, supra note 47, at 44. The history of the creation,
improvement, mass availability, and adoption of timepieces is a fascinating study. See generally
LANDES, supra note 47; DAVA SOBEL, LONGITUDE: THE TRUE STORY OF A LONE GENIUS WHO
SOLVED THE GREATEST SCIENTIFIC PROBLEM OF HIS TIME (1995).
220. Michael O’Malley, Time, Work, and Task Orientation: A Critique of American
Historiography, 1:3 TIME & SOC’Y 341, 355 (1992). “Nature narrates time in preindustrial
societies.” Id. Time is perceived in very different ways in different cultures. For example:
African time sensibilities . . . tended to compound all time, past and future especially,
into what Kenyan scholar John Mbiti calls “No-time.” The net effect of this time
orientation, argues Mbiti, is that the “linear concept of time in Western thought, with an
indefinite past, present and infinite future, is practically foreign to African thinking.”
SMITH, supra note 21, at 131. See also, GLEICK, supra note 46, at 272 (including more discussion
of Mbiti’s research on Africans’ sense of time). There is a good deal of literature on time sense in
other cultures, see, e.g., G.I. Jones, Time and Oral Tradition with Special Reference to Eastern
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Greater sophistication about perceptions of time and its
measurement followed. One example, the creation of the week, suffices
to show how such a seemingly simple time measurement device could
be so complex. In a book devoted to the history of the week,221 the
author, Eviatar Zerubavel, states:
The week is the only major rhythm of human activity that is totally
oblivious to nature, resting on mathematical regularity alone. Its
invention was one of the first major attempts by humans to break away
from being prisoners of nature and create an artificial world of their
own, and therefore ought to be regarded as one of the greatest
breakthroughs in the history of human civilization.222

Zerubavel describes two modern attempts to replace the seven-day
week with an alternative. Both attempts failed because the common
folk, imbued with religious traditions, would not cooperate. The first
attempt was the establishment in France of a ten-day week from 17921805 as part of the change wrought by the French Revolution. (The
metric system was also established at this time.) Eventually, Napoleon
called a halt to the idea. The second experiment took place in Russia
with a five-day week from 1929-31 and a six-day week from 1931-40.
These shorter weeks were supposed to allow for continuous work force
production, but eventually the division between city workers and the
resistant country people became too great and the government
capitulated and returned to the seven-day week.223
Although the modern person takes them for granted, the
complexities of working with a seven-day week, a 365 1/4 day year,

Nigeria, VI J. AFR. HIST. 153 (1965); T.C. McCaskie, Time and the Calendar in Nineteenth
Century Asante: An Exploratory Essay, 7 HIST. IN AFR. 179 (1980); McKenzie, supra note 50;
DOROTHY PENNINGTON, Time in African Culture, ch. 8 in AFRICAN CULTURE: THE RHYTHMS OF
UNITY (M.K. Asante and K.W. Asante eds., 1985); Thomas C. Smith, Peasant Time and Factory
Time in Japan, 111 PAST & PRESENT 165 (1986); Eric Pawson, Local Times and Standard Time in
New Zealand, 18 J. HIST. GEOGRAPHY 278 (1992). The major focus of the rest of this article is on
the way time orientation developed in the West.
221. EVIATAR ZERUBAVEL, THE SEVEN DAY CIRCLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE
WEEK (1985).
222. Id. at 4.
223. Id. These experiments are described in chapter 2. Id. Studies of Russia’s dealing with
time provide a fascinating tangent to the time story. See Daniel H. Kaiser & Peyton Engel, Timeand Age-Awareness in Early Modern Russia, 35 COMP. STUDIES SOC’Y & HIST. 824 (1993)
(concerning time understanding in the early eighteenth century), John Löwenhardt, Over Time:
Time and Politics in the USSR,” 28 SOVIET GEOGRAPHY 656 (1987) (discussing the Russian
successful resistance to Soviet government’s imposition of Summer Saving Time in the 1980s);
‘Statutory Time’ Abolished in USSR, 32 SOVIET GEOGRAPHY 190 (1991). Who knew there was so
much resistance to governmental authority in Soviet Russia?
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months of odd durations, and the attempts to “correct” these problems,
all have an amazingly complex history.224 There were a number of
reform movements in Britain and America in the twentieth century
supporting a perpetual calendar, but in the end all have failed because of
the supposed violation of religious freedom.225 Under a perpetual
calendar, the Sabbath and the Lord’s Day, traditionally Saturday and
Sunday, would start “floating,” a sacrilegious idea to traditionally
religious people who therefore balked.226 Thus the seven-day week
remains one of the last “irrational” cornerstones of modern
civilization.227
In medieval Europe, the Catholic Church made good use of time in
reinforcing its authority.228 Thus, church bells would ring to call the
faithful to pray at specified times of the day and night.229 People in the
countryside came to rely on the bell ringing as an indication of the
224. ZERUBAVEL, supra note 221, at ch. 4.
225. The perpetual calendar had a 364-day (52-week) year, thus necessitating “blank” days
inserted to achieve the 365 1/4 day year. Such blanks would interfere with the standard calculation
of the Sabbath. See ZERUBAVEL, supra note 221, at 69, 81.
226. Id. at 81.
With one “blank” day (or two, in leap years) being excluded from the annual reckoning
of weeks, the Sabbath, for example, would necessarily drift back one or two days every
year, essentially becoming a “floating,” “migrating,” “nomad,” or “wanderer” that might
fall on just any day of the week. That, of course, would have been a preposterous idea
for any traditionalist, for whom the Sabbath and the Lord’s Day had always been
synonymous with Saturday and Sunday.
Id.
227. ZERUBAVEL, supra note 221, at ch. 4.
228. O’Malley, supra note 220, at 346.
Preindustrial Europe derived its sense of what time was from nature—from using natural
signs, like the sun, moon and seasons as indications of time’s passage. But its sense of
how to use time came in large degree from the church, or from a blend of religion and
folkloric custom. In every European community, a church-established calendar of holy
days gave careful prescriptions on how time should be arranged.
Id.
229. See LANDES, supra note 47, at ch. 3 for a description of the time discipline imposed on
monks by the Church. The situation in England is described by E.P.Thompson:
It is by no means clear how far the availability of precise clock time extended at the time
of the industrial revolution. From the fourteenth century onwards church clocks and
public clocks were erected in the cities and large market towns. . . . [T]he sundial
remained in use (partly to set the clock) in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries.
Charitable donations continued to be made in the seventeenth century . . . for the
ringing of early morning bells and curfew bells.
E.P. Thompson, Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism, 38 PAST & PRESENT 56, 63
(1967). Mark M. Smith describes a similar situation in early America. Church bells, which could
be heard for long distances even in the noisy urban north, communicated religious, natural, and
civic time. SMITH, supra note 21, at 44. “God’s time and the various civic functions it served, then,
punched its way both aurally and visually into the minds and ears of all southerners.” Id.
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segment of the day. The ringing of the church bells would cause work to
start and stop in the fields.230
Holy days and holidays often occurred around certain natural
agricultural events.231 Time was God and God was time.232
Protestant faiths carried these connections between nature, time
management and control even further, particularly in England and
America.233 Max Weber argued: “It [time] is infinitely valuable because
every hour lost is lost to labour for the glory of God. Thus inactive
contemplation is also valueless, or even directly reprehensible if it is at
the expense of one’s daily work.”234 At the dawn of the Industrial
Revolution in America, each village, city, town, and farm kept its own
local time based on sun time. Natural time (shown by the sun) as
opposed to mechanical time (shown by clocks) reflected the conflict
between religious authority and secular authority235 and also between
religion and science.236 These conflicts would continue into the
twentieth century.
In the pre-industrial era, time was irregular, something

230. O’Malley, supra note 220, at 347.
In many cases, the same bells, calendars and schedules that governed monastic prayer
regulated the laborer’s day. . . . The Church calendar merged the abstract idea of “Time”
with the “social time” of everyday affairs and seasonal tasks: religion, and not simply
natural, seasonal cycles alone, gave time its bite in daily life.
Id. David Landes points out that the medieval peasant came to resent the controllers of the bells and
many of them were motivated to learn to count by the bells of the clock. LANDES, supra note 47, at
74-82. Knowing the time and how to tell time gave medieval man a sense of power whereas to
modern man the luxury of ignoring time (as on vacation) gives a sense of power. Id.
231. O’Malley, supra note 220, at 346.
232. BLAISE, supra note 16, at 19. “Standard time served most of the functions of God; it set
the standards of trade and commerce, of justice and mercy.” Id. “Time . . . is like a loan from God:
men and women have an obligation to use it wisely, to ‘improve the time,’ as the Puritans put it.”
O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at ix.
233. “In the seventeenth century both New England clergymen and magistrates thought of time
as a holy attribute and urged its productive use by appealing to Puritan theology.” Paul B. Hensley,
Time, Work, and Social Context in New England, 65 NEW ENG Q 531, 533 (1992). “We are
entering here, already in 1700, the familiar landscape of disciplined industrial capitalism, with the
time-sheet, the time-keeper, the informers and the fines.” Thompson, supra note 229, at 82.
“Southern merchants, like northern and British Protestants and puritans, for reasons secular and
sacred, loathed to lose time.” SMITH, supra note 21, at 42. “The connection of time to nature, and
thus to God, that almanacs reinforced points to an American obsession with time, its measurement,
and its proper use.” O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 16.
234. SMITH, supra note 21, at 41, citing MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE
SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM, 158 (1905, 1970). Smith does note numerous challenges to Weber’s thesis.
Id.
235. O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 8-9.
236. “Throughout the nineteenth century, religion and science proved themselves the oil and
water of modern culture.” KLOPPENBERG, supra note 22, at 24.
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approximated by scrutinizing natural clues, but regularity became the
hallmark as mechanized clocks took over.237 In an industrial society,
and one dominated by the sense of Puritan time thrift,238 as well as the
“ethos of self-control in the emerging middle class,”239 time became a
commodity to be bought and sold.240
But who in the newly industrialized American society of the early
nineteenth century determined what time it was?241 This was an
important question because employers and employees distrusted one
another to be the sole arbiter of time.242 This was not just a problem in
237. “Where time had been an abundant resource that suffered squandering at the beginning of
the nineteenth century, it became a scarce one that required husbanding.” Martin Bruegel, ‘Time
that can be relied upon.’ The Evolution of Time Consciousness in the Mid-Hudson Valley, 17901860, 28 J. SOC. HIST. 547, 548 (1995).
238. E.P. Thompson summed it up well:
In all these ways—by the division of labour; the supervision of labour; fines; bells and
clocks; money incentives; preachings and schoolings; the suppression of fairs and
sports—new labour habits were formed, and a new time-discipline was imposed. . . .
....
Throughout the nineteenth century the propaganda of time-thrift continued to be directed
at the working people, the rhetoric becoming more debased, the apostrophes to eternity
becoming more shop-soiled, the homilies more mean and banal. In early Victorian tracts
and reading-matter aimed at the masses one is choked by the quantity of the stuff. . . .
[Re leisure:] This, clearly, was worse than Bingo: non-productivity, compounded by
impertinence. In mature capitalist society all time must be consumed, marketed, put to
use; it is offensive for the labour force merely to “pass the time.”
Thompson, supra note 229, at 90-91.
239. Bruegel, supra note 237, at 554.
240. Time as property goes back a long way. As Landes points out, in China in the sixteenth
century, time as private property was anathema because all property belonged to the Emperor.
LANDES, supra note 47, at 52. And if it belonged to the Emperor, why bother to measure it, keep
track of it, etc.? Id. Smith notes: “But before merchants could reduce time to money, they had to
break free from Christian imperatives stressing that all time belonged to God.” SMITH, supra note
21, at 63. And, of course, in the antebellum South, “[t]ime, after all, was the master’s, as it had to
be in a slave society.” Id. at 7.
241. Time in its many disguises is part of the great debate over the just derivation of
power. Who “‘owns’” time? That is, who holds the ultimate right to negotiate its value—the
worker or the boss? The tenant or the lord? The merchant or the priest? Elected officials or
an inherited elite? Why are some born slaves to time, and others released entirely from its
constraints?
BLAISE, supra note 16, at 22.
242. Labor disputes in the 1830s erupted over the conflict between using the employer’s bell to
start and stop the workday or using the employees’ watches. See Bruegel, supra note 237, at 557
(discussing such a labor dispute in Catskill, New York); Hensley, supra note 233, at 531 (discussing
a New Hampshire labor dispute). In the south, Smith described the conflict thus:
On some important points, then, industrial capitalists and antebellum slave owners
sometimes agreed: both harbored, to varying degrees, a distrust and suspicion of
workers, slave and free. Neither laborer, so it seemed, would work diligently unless
coerced to some extent, and a monopoly over time, who owned it, and who set its value
helped ensure this control.
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the urban industrial North. Slaves, the predominant labor force in the
antebellum American South, were not allowed to learn to tell time just as
they were not allowed to learn to read and write.243 It would have been
too dangerous to allow them so much control. In the North, factory
owners kept the clock although workers were often suspicious of the
accuracy of the timekeeper.244 As the production of watches grew in
post-Civil War America, employees became their own timekeepers.
Clock discipline finally came into its own.245 “The way people used
time was central to the way society judged them. Deviation from the
standards of public time, like deviation from established morality,
marked the dissenter as a danger.”246
Exactly how was time determined? Solar time, or apparent time,
could be determined by the sun’s position on a sundial.247 When an
observer noted the sun reaching its highest point in the sky, it was noon.
However at different times of the year the sun would pass at a higher or
lower point in the sky. “Astronomers call this annoying habit the sun’s
declination.”248
The situation became more problematic when clocks were
created,249 because clocks could not follow these seeming irregularities
of the sun’s movement and, therefore, gave an average, or mean time.250
Obviously, great potential existed for conflict between God’s time and
man-made time. Essentially, God’s time is sun time. It varies in
SMITH, supra note 21, at 6.
243. SMITH, supra note 21, at 133-36 (discussing fear of insurrections if slaves could tell time).
Inevitably some slaves learned to tell time, especially cooks who had to follow timed recipes. Id. at
144-45. A slave woman in Natchez held a “midnight school” from 11:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m. to teach
other slaves to read and write. Id. She could do this only because she could tell time. Id.
244. O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 30. “The watch itself . . . becomes the authority for time,
and its owner derives power from ownership.” ’Id.
245. Id. at 23. “No substantial domestic watch industry appeared before the Civil War.” Id.
However, Smith argues that time orientation came to the antebellum South in the 1840s. SMITH,
supra note 21, at 68.
246. O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 72. For an extended discussion of the impact of factory
time on nineteenth century American family life, see Allan Pred, Production, Family, and FreeTime
Projects: A Time-Geographic Perspective on the Individual and Societal Change in NineteenthCentury U.S. Cities, 7 J. HIST. GEOGRAPHY 3 (1981).
247. Every method of telling time has had its critics. Take the ancient Roman playwright,
Titus Maccius Plautus. “Plautus had cursed the most advanced time-slicing technology he knew,
the sundial: ‘The gods confound the man who first found out how to distinguish hours! Confound
him, too, who in this place set up a sundial to cut and hack my days so wretchedly into small
portions!’” GLEICK, supra note 46, at 44, quoting Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae, 3.3.
248. O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 3.
249. For more about timepieces created throughout the history of the world, see LANDES, supra
note 47.
250. O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 3.
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infinitely small increments around the longitude of the world. Sun time
in Chicago is different from sun time in a suburb ten miles west of
Chicago. A sundial in the suburb would show the difference when
compared to a sundial in Chicago. But small increments of sun time
create difficulties in communication and coordination across geography.
And so, man-made time was created.
Standard time took things a step further, both in efficiency and in
conflict.251
The earth was divided into 24 time zones, each
approximately 1,000 miles at the equator or 15 degrees of longitude
wide at all latitudes.252 The time for the entire zone was determined at a
point midway in the zone. This worked well for that middle area but
became more annoying at the edges of the zone where standard time
might vary from sun time by as much as 66 minutes.253
Much of nineteenth century American history is dominated by the
history of the railroads.254 This is particularly true with respect to
American time history. “Between 1840 and 1860 total American
railroad mileage increased more than ten times, while average speeds
doubled.”255 This was an exciting era, one in which Henry David
251. Standard time has been defined as time based upon a certain definite meridian that is
adopted by law or usage as the time meridian for a more or less wide extent of country,
in place of the various meridians upon which local mean time is based. Its advantage is
that neighboring communities or places keep exactly the same time, instead of differing
by a few minutes or seconds according to their difference of longitude, a matter of
especial importance in connection with the operation of railroads and telegraphs, or the
transaction of any business wherein contracts involve any definite time limits.
No. 10122. Standard Time Zone Investigation, 51 I.C.C. 273, 278 (1918). “Of all the
inventions of the Industrial Age, standard time has endured, virtually unchanged, the
longest. . . . Arguably, standard time has exercised the deepest influence on everything to
come afterwards.” BLAISE, supra note 16, at 12.
252. BLAISE, supra note 16, at 8.
253. Bartky, supra note 25, at 52-53.
254. “Railroads emboldened us. . . . It is the perception of movement on all fronts, like
skittering pond life, that defined the last two-thirds of the nineteenth century, and it is the railroad
that lends itself as the single most conspicuous symbol of the Industrial Age.” BLAISE, supra note
16, at 138. See also SMITH, supra note 21, ch. 3, and Zerubavel, supra note 16. Analogies have
been drawn between the transportation revolution of the nineteenth century and the Internet
revolution of the twentieth century. See, e.g., Jason Zweig, Baloney.com Don’t Believe the Hype
About Internet Stocks and Funds, MONEY 63-66 (May 1999). In fact, all the new technologies of
the late nineteenth century eventually are compared to the Internet. See also TOM STANDAGE, THE
VICTORIAN INTERNET: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF THE TELEGRAPH AND THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY’S ON-LINE PIONEERS (1998).
255. O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 61. See also, STEPHENS, supra note 28, at 9th unnumbered
page:
Railroad and telegraph lines spanned the continent with amazing speed. Only 23 miles
of track had been laid in the United States by 1830; by the end of the Civil War, the
number had grown to 35,000 miles; and on the eve of the adoption of Standard Railway
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Thoreau said that men talked and thought faster due to the electrifying
effect of the railroad.256 When the railroad was a relatively small,
localized operation, keeping schedule according to the local sun time of
the towns the train travelled through was not overly problematic. But as
the railroad grew, the use of local times became increasingly complex.257
People did not know when to expect trains to arrive or depart and there
were safety issues involved with so many more trains using the same
tracks.258 Finally, in 1883, all the American railroad companies agreed
to run on standard time, with the continental United States divided into
four time zones.259 In 1884, the Prime Meridian Conference was held in
Washington, D.C., and a world delegation determined that standard time
would be adopted. The world would be divided into 24 time zones, and
Greenwich would be the prime meridian.260 While the world had now
adopted standard time, there was still considerable resistance to its
enforcement in many locations including the United States.261
At the turn of the century there were technological advances in
transportation, communication, and every facet of the way people in the
Time there were over 93,000 miles. Telegraph lines—cheaper and easier to erect—
spread even quicker. Between 1847, when the telegraph was commercially introduced,
and 1860, 50,000 miles of wire went into operation; by 1880, 31,703,000 messages a
year flashed over 291,000 miles of wire.
Id.
256. O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 68.
257. Id. at 73. But see Bartky, supra note 25, at 34, who insists it was not the railroad but “the
need for a uniform system in geophysics—for simultaneity of observations—that led to the adoption
of standard time in the United States.”
258. Stephens, supra note 1, at 17-21; BLAISE, supra note 16, at 72. But, Ian Bartky insists
that no traveler was confused—all they had to do was ask. Bartky, supra note 25, at 33.
259. O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 140. “Standard time advanced with all the weight and
momentum of industrial progress, and its opponents were clearly out of step with prevailing opinion
in most published sources.” Id. For a description of the day, Sunday, November 18, 1883, that
standard time was adopted, see id. at chapter 3: “The Day of Two Noons.”
[T]he railroad became the arbiter of time as of so much else in the nation and in the
South. . . . Yet there was no guarantee the trains could always adhere to their own
standard. . . . The train, everyone came to realize, lived according to a schedule that
suited the system, the mechanism. The locomotive passed through nearly a thousand
Southern counties but it belonged to none of them.
EDWARD L. AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER RECONSTRUCTION 12 (1992)
(footnote omitted).
260. BLAISE, supra note 16, at 212. “A great hinge had creaked shut and the world had been
fundamentally altered. Sundial time was banished, a sophisticated abstraction had taken its place.
Not a penny was spent, not a drop of blood spilled.” Id. See id. at 194, for a description of the
Prime Meridian Conference of 1884.
261. SMITH, supra note 21, at 92. “Not all, however, relished the temporal control the railroads
in particular, the agents of time consciousness generally, imposed on society.” Id. Such feelings
went back to the days of Curtis v. March, this 1858 British case is considered in the text
accompanying note 8.
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western world lived and worked.262
The pace of change had
quickened263 and it was measured by the ever-improving, increasingly
available264 timepieces which facilitated an unprecedented time
orientation.265 Awareness of time speeded up change and change
motivated an addiction to the awareness of time.266 The 19th century
perceived itself as moving faster than ever before, and not just on trains.
An unrelenting haste began to permeate American life.
So why would these sophisticated, modern individuals with their
eyes on their watches and their ears tuned to the train’s whistle tolerate
life in a society where some people still told time by the sun while others
relied on watches and some jurisdictions relied on solar time while
others ran by railroad (standard) time? Because the urban sophisticates
were just one of many groups living in America at the turn of the
twentieth century and telling time was only one of many social issues
with which this country was grappling.
V. THE DARKER SIDE: AMERICA, 1870-1914
Always there was a darker side to the exciting and monumental
changes wrought during this period. “Americans in a basic sense no
longer knew who or where they were. The setting had altered beyond
their power to understand it, and within an alien context they had lost
themselves.”267 In the immediate post-Civil War period, America was a
nation of small communities and small businesses where neighbors were
262. KERN, supra note 22, at 110. “There was no question that the pace of life was greatly
accelerated, but there was sharp debate about the meaning and value of speed.” Id.
263. Id. at 88. “The world was racing into the future like the Titanic into the North Atlantic,
and those who looked ahead foresaw both shipwreck and the wonders of time travel.” Id.
264. Id. at 111. “The new profusion of watches was a response to, as well as a cause of, a
heightened sense of punctuality in this period, especially in urban centers.” Id. O’Malley relates
the story of the popularity of watches increasing after the Civil War as their prices went down and
their availability from mail order businesses like Sears Roebuck and Montgomery Ward increased.
O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 183.
265. O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 256. “Modern life,” the pioneering sociologist Thorsten
Veblen observed in 1916, “goes by clockwork.” Id. “The railroad and the telegraph, more than any
previous factors, underscored the time-related values of punctuality and speed and nudged those
values higher in the 19th-century American consciousness.” Stephens, supra note 1, at 2-3.
266. “The age had its doubts and hesitations, but it was essentially characterized by hubris that
ignored the warning messages and pushed the throttle full speed ahead.” KERN, supra note 22, at
108.
267. ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877-1920 at 42-43 (1967). See also
Kenneth Cmiel, Destiny and Amnesia: The Vision of Modernity in Robert Wiebe’s THE SEARCH FOR
ORDER, 21 REV. IN AM. HIST. 352 (1993) (characterizing Wiebe’s book as “a much sadder book
than is normally thought, one that paints a rather grim, even bleak, picture of life in the twentieth
century.”) Id.
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known and hierarchies understood.268 But that “nation of loosely
connected islands”269 changed as railroads and businesses expanded.
Big business, ultimately requiring regulation,270 came into its own.271
The 1870s were dominated by a six year economic depression,
triggered by the railroads no longer attracting long term investments.272
Economic depressions were something people tended to view as a moral
judgment.273 The exhilaration, or at least relief, that had come with the
end of the Civil War had changed during Reconstruction. “Out of this
process [Reconstruction] had come a haunting sense of the war’s failure,
a vague feeling of political betrayal.”274
As Robert Wiebe suggests in his book, The Search for Order, 18771920, average Americans continued to try to solve problems with a preCivil War mentality, not recognizing that the world had drastically
changed.275 One of many examples of this was railroad management.
[D]espite a past strewn with disappointment, railroad executives
continued to lay track they did not want to build, engage in rate wars
they had wished to avoid, and count on a perpetual prosperity that

268. WIEBE, supra note 267, at 2.
269. Id. at 4.
270. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (Feb. 4, 1887) (current version at 49
U.S.C. §§ 1-22, 25-27, 153, 301-302, 314-327, 901-923, 1001-1022), and Sherman Anti-Trust Act,
ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (July 2, 1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7).
Then in 1887 Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Act, an evasive measure that
ostensibly outlawed pooling and a number of discriminatory practices. Because the law
did not seriously restrict railroads, some executives actually welcomed it as a protective
cover. Nevertheless, the mere passage of such an act through a Congress of the late
nineteenth century indicated the breadth of antagonism toward the iron autocrats.
WIEBE, supra note 267, at 53-54. See also RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 233-34
(1955). “From the very beginning, at any rate, when the Sherman Anti-Trust Act was passed in
1890, it was recognized by most of the astute politicians of that hour as a gesture, a ceremonial
concession to an overwhelming public demand for some kind of reassuring action against the
trusts.” Id. at 245. See also EISENACH, supra note 41, at 156-61, (discussing the ineffectiveness of
these two laws).
271. WIEBE, supra note 267, at 40. Wiebe describes a “segmented morality:” piety on Sunday
and then animal cunning in the business world during the week. Id. In response to industrial
growth, Americans, “in a time of confusion . . . responded with a quantitative ethic that became the
hallmark of their crisis in values. It seemed that the age could only be comprehended in bulk. Men
defined issues by how much, how many, how far. . . . [T]he cult of the millionaires arrived.” Id.
272. Id. at 1.
273. Id. at 2. “In a nation geared to promotion and expansion, stagnant years had traditionally
carried a special frustration. They were literally soul-searching times, for throughout the nineteenth
century a great many looked upon economic downturns as a moral judgment, precise punishment
for the country’s sins.” Id. There would be another, far worse depression in the international
economy in the early 1890s. See AYERS, supra note 259, at 283.
274. WIEBE, supra note 267, at 5.
275. WIEBE, supra note 267.
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would never come. What seemed to them a series of rational responses
added up to an utterly irrational industrial policy that courted danger
for large portions of a dependent economy.276

The Great Railroad Strike of 1877 exemplified the strangeness of the
time.277 In July 1877, the management of the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad announced another in a series of wage cuts that set off a wildcat
strike that spread across the country.278 “In the towns, people expressed
a rather orderly hostility to the roads. But in the cities crowds gathered
and milled, clashed with trigger-happy vigilantes and militia, then
drifted downtown to riot and loot.”279 Federal troops were called out,
the rioting put down, and then the event was quickly dismissed as “no
more than a bad memory”280 as Americans resumed their relentless pace,
“building, growing, expanding.”281
In the 1880s the railroads continued to expand, but now like the rest
of the business world, had to contend with the growth of unions.282
“[M]embership in the Knights of Labor [swelled] from 50,000 in 1884 to
more than 700,000 in 1886.”283 The sons and grandsons of Irish and
German immigrants were assuming their place in the American world of
work and they were not so malleable: “A docile generation was giving
way to a demanding one.”284
By 1891, 40 percent of railroads were in receivership, obviously
posing a huge problem for the American economy.285 J.P. Morgan, the
276. Id. at 19.
What was true of business in general applied as well to banking. . . . With intuitive
methods for gauging the business cycle and rule-of-thumb measures for evaluating credit
risks, [bankers] relied on stabs of shrewdness, not long-range wisdom, in conducting
their affairs. Bankers at all levels strained to comprehend an increasingly complex,
impersonal operation.
Id. at 21. “In fact, at one time or another in the decade following the war, portions of every sector
of the American population felt defrauded by bankers.” LAWRENCE GOODWYN, THE POPULIST
MOMENT: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE AGRARIAN REVOLT IN AMERICA 13 (1978). For a particularly
lucid description of the currency problems during the Civil War and the use of the gold and silver
standard versus the use of paper money (greenbacks because of the green ink). See id. at 10-12.
277. This account is taken from WIEBE, supra note 267, at 10.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. WIEBE, supra note 267, at 44-45: There were “two bursts of railroad construction, one
following 1879 and the other 1885, which together produced more trackage than any comparable
period in American history.” Id. at 47.
283. Id. at 44-45.
284. Id. at 50.
285. Id. at 26. See also EISENACH, supra note 41, at 158:
Even with the gold standard to guarantee steady flows of foreign investment and the
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financier,286 provided an elegant and simple solution.
By and large the receiverships did not reflect economic disaster. In an
effort to entice investors during the prosperous years, many railroads
had financed their expansion through bonds with payments enforceable
at law, and now sudden hard times led them to pass a dividend. . . .
[T]hey entered a technical bankruptcy . . . [and] reorganized the
corporations by paring the bonded debt and weighting their finances
with common stock. For the first time in a depression capitalists had
appreciable money to invest. . . . The economy’s surplus had brought
power—and very handsome fees—to a small pocket of investment
bankers, whose reorientation of a fundamental industry pointed toward
broad changes in the structure of business.287

While the focus has been on the railroads as an example of the
changes sweeping America in the post-Reconstruction era of the 1870s80s, the same unrest, uneasiness and searching for a redefinition took
place in other industries, in town and country, within established
communities and immigrant enclaves.
The agrarian myth had taken hold in America by the early
nineteenth century.288 But after the Civil War, farmers’ children left
their family farms in increasing numbers to seize the opportunities and
embrace the excitement of the newly emerging cities, prompting laments
from traditionalists. “In the imagery of these appeals the earth was
characteristically a mother, trade a harlot, and desertion of ancestral
ways a betrayal that invited Providential punishment.”289 Despite the
agrarian myth which gripped the American imagination well into the
establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in 1887 to override state
beggar-thy-neighbor competition for low rates, such were the statutory ambiguity and
the multiple demands placed on the Commission by regional competition for low rates
that railroad bankruptcy was the norm. And, until the ICC was given substantial new
authority in 1906 and 1910, it fell to masters appointed by federal bankruptcy judges to
restructure by fiat entire regional and national systems of rail transportation.
Id. at 158 (footnotes omitted). See SKOWRONEK, supra note 42, at 248-284, for an account of the
reconstituted Interstate Commerce Commission and its regulation of the railroads after World War
I.
286. MARTIN GILBERT, 1 A HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 43 (1997). Of J.P.
Morgan, “[t]he British philosopher Bertrand Russell . . . wrote: ‘Edward VII, the Kaiser, and the
Pope, entertained him as if he were a visiting monarch’ . . . . [T]he answer to ‘Who made the
world?’ was ‘God made the world in 4004 BC, but it was reorganized by James H. Hull, J. Pierpont
Morgan and John D. Rockefeller.’” Id.
287. WIEBE, supra note 267, at 26.
288. See HOFSTADTER, supra note 270, at 23-36 (examining the “Yeoman and the Myth”).
289. Id. at 33. “Here was the irony from which the farmer suffered above all others: the United
States was the only country in the world that began with perfection and aspired to progress.” Id. at
35-36.
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twentieth century, the reality of farm life, especially post-Civil War was
far from benevolent.290 The crop lien system, especially prevalent in the
South, was a particularly pernicious form of servitude.291 The proceeds
from a farmer’s crops were never quite enough to cover what he owed
the furnishing merchant who loaned the farmer enough money at
usurious interest rates to put in his crop each year and otherwise barely
subsist. The deep humiliation suffered by these farmers over decades
eventually fueled the Populist movement.292
From 1870 to 1910, the population of the United States increased
two and one-third times, and most of that growth took place in urban
environments among the new middle class.293 Cities grew rapidly in the
United States between 1860 and 1910.294 They filled with rural people
and immigrants and being so new, they were not effectively managed.295
The cost of living in the United States rose 35 percent between 1897 and
1913; this was particularly problematic for laborers with stagnant wages
and only fed the growth of labor unions.296 This was the dawn of
muckraking journalism: “It was muckraking that brought the diffuse
malaise of the public into focus.”297
The general restlessness led to reform movements in the 1890s,
notably the Populist movement298 and, after the turn of the century, the
290. Id.
291. See GOODWYN, supra note 276, at 20-25. See also, AYERS, supra note 259, chs. 8 and 9
(describing the life of Southern farmers and the political alliances that eventually grew up in
response to the evils of the crop lien system). For a different perspective on the problem, see
EISENACH, supra note 41, at 181.
The curse of the post-Civil War South was its gradual reenslavement of the freedmen
and poor whites in the grinding poverty of agricultural tenancy and subsistence farming.
Every decade after the war ended, the number of farms in the southern states increased,
and every decade per capita income fell relative to the national average. In contrast,
agriculture in both the “old” and the “new” Midwest was thriving in partnership with the
new corporations. Farms were declining in numbers and rapidly and systematically
increasing their productivity. From the 1870s onward, both materially and morally, they
were becoming an integral part of the new industrial economy.
Id.
292. GOODWYN, supra note 276, at 26. “How to cope with the lien system? Some of the
farmers decided politics was the answer and they tried to lead the order into the Greenback Party.”
Id.
293. HOFSTADTER, supra note 270, at 217-18.
294. Id. at 174.
295. Id. at 175.
296. Id. at 168-69.
297. Id. at 187. “Corruption thus became a particularly fine issue for the moral energies of the
Progressive. He was ready to be convinced that the country was thoroughly wicked, and the
muckrakers supplied him with a wealth of plausible evidence.” Id. at 212.
298. Richard Hofstadter defines Populism as more than just the Populist party of the 1890s; it
was a “popular impulse that is endemic in American political culture. . . . that expressed the
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Progressive movement.299 “Populism appeared to gain strength with
each election. . . . [T]he party won almost 10 percent of the Presidential
vote in 1892; . . . two years later its total vote rose by nearly 50 percent,
and for the first time it captured a Southern state.”300 Populism, a rural
phenomenon, tended to be popular with the “little guy,” the one who felt
cheated by the growing successes of the industrial barons.301 Again
Wiebe is instructive in his description of the 1890s.302
Anxiety, like the common cold, was a most egalitarian malady which
in many respects ran the same course wherever it struck. Men in
formal authority, equally disturbed by their sprawling, impersonal
society, also reached out for that essential, elusive mastery. Like the
protectors of the community, they underwent a basic shift in outlook
which converted incidents into series, giving their worries that same
cumulative, self-fueling quality. . . .
In the baldest sense, they came to fear that the people might rule.
Individualism, except as a mode of implicit contempt for the scattered
discontents of a great many farmers and businessmen with the economic changes of the late
nineteenth century.” HOFSTADTER, supra note 270, at 4-5.
299. HOFSTADTER, supra note 270, at 4. Progressivism, as defined by Richard Hofstadter, is
not just the Progressive Party, but:
[T]hat broader impulse toward criticism and change that was everywhere so conspicuous
after 1900, when the already forceful stream of agrarian discontent was enlarged and
redirected by the growing enthusiasm of middle-class people for social and economic
reform. . . . Its general theme was the effort to restore a type of economic individualism
and political democracy that was widely believed to have existed earlier in America and
to have been destroyed by the great corporation and the corrupt political machine; and
with that restoration to bring back a kind of morality and civic purity that was also
believed to have been lost.
Id. at 5-6. But see Rodgers, supra note 39, at 114 (outlining numerous attempts by historians to
define progressivism). “Only by discarding the mistaken assumption of a coherent reform
movement could one see the progressives’ world for what it really was: an era of shifting,
ideologically fluid, issue-focused coalitions, all competing for the reshaping of American society.”
Id. at 114. See also KLOPPENBERG, supra note 22, at 10. “As political theories and political
movements, the American and European varieties of social democracy and progressivism were too
multifaceted and dynamic to be contained neatly within generalizations drawn from twenty or even
several hundred individuals.” Kloppenberg does however take a stab at defining progressivism.
KLOPPENBERG, supra note 22. He notes that there were at least four different strains: 1) the
political reformers who wanted to streamline government; 2) the antimonopolists; 3) the nativists
and prohibitionists; and 4) those with “social consciousness” who felt the individual had a “social
duty” and that government existed for the “common good.” Id. at 311. The reformist impulses of
these four groups were often at odds. Id. at 300. Kloppenberg also emphasizes the graduated or
progressive income tax as the “central doctrine of progressivism,” and “the quintessential
progressive reform”. Id. at 300, 355.
300. WIEBE, supra note 267, at 90.
301. Id. at 85.
302. WIEBE, supra note 267, at 76-77.
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sheep below, almost always referred to the rights of an elite to retain
what they held and to acquire more; cohesion meant an imposed order,
one that would necessitate a sharp-edged enforcement.303

The Pullman strike of 1894 in which Chicago railroad workers, members
of the American Railway Union under Eugene Debs, paralyzed the hub
of the nation’s railroads, was effectively put down by the newly formed
coalition of “men in formal authority.”304 “The basic new machinery-an
employers’ association, an alert national executive, strategically placed
troops, and an amenable judiciary—had combined to crack the boycott
and smash the union.”305
The Republican candidate, William McKinley, won the presidential
election of 1896, signalling the death of Populism and momentarily
stalling the reform movement impulse.306 From 1895-1905, a new
middle class arose, dividing itself among professionals, businessmen,
and big farmers. Neither the poor lower class nor the rich upper class
was particularly sympathetic to this new middle class.307 “Members of
the new class announced their bold visions too loudly and exposed too
often the shadows on their own bright faith.”308 It was the vigorous
middle class that would usher in the Progressive movement in the first
decade of the twentieth century.309
Several points in this more general history of the period strike a
chord in the history of time. One concern is the developing view of the
human personality. “Despite some borrowing from recent European
philosophy, faculty psychology as Americans employed it was rooted
fundamentally in this Christian tradition of God and the Devil struggling
for man’s soul.”310 This echoes the conflict over sun time (God’s time)
versus man-made clock time.
This was the era of American behaviorism, scientific management,
pragmatism, the scientific method, bureaucracy, and the social gospel.311

303. Id.
304. Id. at 76, 91.
305. Id. at 92.
306. Id. at 104-05. “Throughout America a residual fear had shrunk the outer limits of
optimism.” Id. at 110.
307. Id. at 130.
308. Id. at 132. “They had enough insight into their lives to recognize that the old ways and
old values would no longer suffice. Often confused, they were still the ones with the determination
to fight those confusions and mark a new route into the modern world.” Id.
309. Id. at 208. “Progressivism reached floodtide around 1912.” Id.
310. Id. at 148.
311. Id. at ch. 7 (“Progressivism Arrives”).
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With the development of these ideas came a new urban progressivism.312
Utility regulation increased; taxes were assessed; the secret ballot as well
as child and female protective legislation was enacted.313 Women began
to exercise political influence.314 Smooth administration in corporations
and in government, “a frictionless bureaucracy,”315 became the
aspiration.316 The world became modern and part of this modernity was
the inevitable need to have one, agreed-upon, easily understood mode
for telling time.317
As the century turned, change was the watchword.
Close to the center of each theory of change lay the problem of
society’s cohesion. What held it together as it moved? The original
classical theory answered that cohesion came as a by-product of the
natural laws. Entrepreneurial genius, self-interest, and habit combined
to integrate any society that was abiding by fundamental principles.
Yet in the face of actual conflict, its advocates could only threaten
greater wreckage as an incentive to unite. Nothing guaranteed
cohesion. A society could always commit suicide, it seemed, if its
members chose.318

And if ever one needed an example of such breakdown of cohesion,
such societal suicide, one need not look farther than World War I,319 for
312. Id.
313. For comprehensive histories of the legislative and administrative changes that took place
in American society during the Progressive era, see MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW
ECONOMY: PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1900-1933 (1990) and MORTON
KELLER, REGULATING A NEW SOCIETY: PUBLIC POLICY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICA, 19001933 (1994). See SKOWRONEK, supra note 42, at 248-84 for his description of the ascendancy of
the Interstate Commerce Commission and its regulation of the railroads in the Progressive era.
314. EISENACH, supra note 41, at 9:
But whether possessed of the vote or not, beginning in the 1890s, politically active
women and their male allies became leaders, publicists, and sponsors of an avalanche of
local, state, and national legislation regarding child and female labor, compulsory school
attendance, the age of female consent for sex and for marriage, food safety, housing
conditions, and prostitution.
Id.
315. WIEBE, supra note 267, at 161.
316. Id. at 170. “Scientific government, the urban reformers believed, would bring
opportunity, progress, order, and community.” Id. In corporations there were more administrative
centralization and reliance on experts. Id. at 181.
317. Id. at 295. “As if to remind citizens of the modern day while they hurried about their
affairs, Congress imposed standard time zones across the land.” Id.
318. Id. at 155.
319. “War created abnormalities in abundance. Sharp inflation, a new vocabulary, and a welter
of government agencies each expressed part of a strangeness that filtered rapidly through American
society in 1917. . . . The most powerful influence was a generalized sense of national crisis, one
which millions predicated but could not define.” WIEBE, supra note 267, at 286. “World War I
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Americans the most disillusioning, cataclysmic disruption of life since
the Civil War.320 And for Europeans World War I was worse because it
was fought on their home territory. As Stephen Kern describes it in his
book, The Culture of Time and Space 1880-1918, the time perception of
the average person changed radically with the War.321 “So, in the larger
world, the impact of the automobile and of all the accelerating
technology was at least twofold—it speeded up the tempo of current
existence and transformed the memory of years past, the stuff of
everybody’s identity, into something slow.”322
The increased pace of daily life was not the only dramatic change.
The very class system and the black and white mind-set of the Victorians
was gone forever.323 In fact, the change had begun even earlier. “In
sociological terms, the class system was changing, and the mighty
railroad was the cause.”324
It is against this picture of the late nineteenth/early twentieth
centuries, that one must consider the court cases previously analyzed.
While there were specific principles of law that could explain away each
of those cases, those principles tend to trivialize the opinions. I suggest
that these disputes reached the states’ highest courts because a larger
issue was involved: the determination of time. No longer a private
matter of individual autonomy, time’s reckoning was receiving
inconsistent treatment by the courts who were struggling with this
dilemma. Now it was up to the national legislature to take over.
was the apotheosis of the prewar sense of speed.” KERN, supra note 22, at 299.
320. “The great war and its aftershocks shattered the politics of progressivism on both sides of
the Atlantic.” KLOPPENBERG, supra note 22, at 370. There is, however, no one, true, and
indisputable interpretation of any event in the Progressive era. Not everyone was devastated by the
war. “Indeed, for those more cosmopolitan Progressives in charge, the shortness of the war
occasioned regret. . . . [T]o many Progressive intellectuals the war was proof that America and
Americans were capable of higher national service and selfless national citizenship.” EISENACH,
supra note 41, at 247. If the war had only continued longer, more such selflessness could have been
shown.
321. See, e.g., KERN, supra note 22, ch. 11, The Cubist War, at 288-312. Kern is not the only
one who has noted the change of time discipline and perception. “An obsession before the war,
efficiency acquired near-religious status once the war began.” O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 271.
322. KERN, supra note 22, at 129. This idea has been echoed by James Gleick: “We fool
ourselves with false nostalgia—a nostalgia for what never was. Whenever we speed up the present,
as a curious side effect we slow down the past.” GLEICK, supra note 46, at 277. Clark Blaise offers
a similar analysis: “We want more speed but we resent, or at least lament, the elimination of the
slower and, arguably, finer, more graceful experiences they replace.” BLAISE, supra note 16, at
145.
323. KERN, supra note 22, at 301. “World War I assaulted far more of the hierarchical
structures of privilege than its participants had ever expected.” Id.
324. BLAISE, supra note 16, at 142-43, discussing CHARLES DICKENS, DOMBEY AND SON
(1848).
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VI. CONGRESS FINALLY ACTS
The American chapter of the story of “legal” time reached a
watershed when the United States Congress, on March 19, 1918, enacted
legislation establishing both standard time and daylight saving time.325
A year later, daylight saving time was repealed,326 starting a cycle of
enactment and repeal that would continue throughout the twentieth
century.327
Standard time was established by dividing the continental United
States into five time zones at the 75th, 90th, 105th, 120th, and 150th
(including only Alaska) degrees of longitude west of Greenwich.328 The
limits of each zone were to be defined by the Interstate Commerce
Commission “having regard for the convenience of commerce. . . .”329
Hereafter the standard times would be called Eastern, Central, Mountain,
Pacific, and Alaska.
Daylight saving time was to start on the last Sunday of March each
year by advancing the standard time within each zone one hour and this
condition was to last until the last Sunday of October when the clocks
would be turned back one hour.330
The motivation for passage of this act mainly focused on the
daylight saving part, even though it would be repealed a year later.
Daylight saving time had been tried in Europe during World War I and
was considered successful for fuel conservation and national efficiency.
“The return in gardening, the fuel saving, and the general health
improvement—those are the three main arguments”331 advanced for
daylight saving time. Gardening produced more food in wartime. The
extra hour of light benefited health by making possible more outdoor
recreation and benefited food production by making gardening possible
in the evenings. Regarding fuel savings,
The various electric lighting companies of England . . . showed an
average reduction of 23 percent in amount of light consumed.
325. See 40 Stat. 450-51 (1918).
326. See 41 Stat. 280 (1919).
327. See STEPHENS, supra note 28, at 17th unnumbered page (giving a brief history of daylight
saving time in the United States). See also HEIDI G. YACKER, DAYLIGHT SAVING TIME, CRS REP.
TO CONG. No. 98-99C (1998).
328. 40 Stat. 450-51, § 1 (1918).
329. 40 Stat. 450-51, § 1 (1918).
330. 40 Stat. 450-51, § 3 (1918).
331. A Bill to Save Daylight and to Provide Standard Time for the United States: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, S. 1854, 65th Cong. 5 (1917)
(testimony of Mr. Matthew M. Marks of New York City, President of the National Daylight Saving
Association).
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The estimated saving in gas amounted to about 9 percent.
The estimated saving in coal consumption throughout the United
Kingdom is 260,000 tons. There was also a considerable saving in the
quantity of illuminating oil.332

In the United States, “[t]his conservation and this economy, in view of
the fact that upward of $350,000,000 worth of coal, oil, and gas are
wasted annually, should commend themselves to those who believe in
the elimination of unnecessary waste.”333
It all sounded so good, so patriotic. Yet daylight saving time was
repealed a year later.334 The standard time for each zone had been set at
the center of each zone, and so there was at least a half hour discrepancy
at the eastern and western boundaries of each zone from mean or solar
time. When daylight saving time went into effect, this discrepancy
increased to an hour and a half at the western edge of each zone.335 “It is
this wide and unnatural discrepancy which has given rise to much of the
opposition to daylight saving.”336
There was “almost universal complaint from the coal miners, truck
gardeners, and farmers in eastern Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois.”337 From
the coal miner’s standpoint:
He finishes his work while the sun is still high and returns home, but
must go to bed while it is still light in order that he may secure
sufficient sleep for his next day’s work. For men engaged in such
dangerous and arduous work as coal mining Congress should legislate
to lighten their burdens, and their comfort and necessities should more
strongly appeal to us than the pleasure and convenience of others.338

For the farmers, daylight saving time, “disturb[ed] nature’s plan for
both man and beast.”339 It affected milk processing and there was a
problem with the dew on the ground in the morning which had to be
burned off by the sun before farm laborers could go to work.340 There
was thus a loss of two morning hours with daylight saving time instead

332. Id. at 6.
333. Id. at 23. (Daylight Saving: Report of R.L. Brunet to lighting committee of city council
of Providence, R.I., March, 1917).
334. 41 Stat. 280 (1919).
335. H.R. REP. NO. 3854, at 1-2 (1919).
336. Id. at 2.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 3.
340. Id.
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of one hour under solar time.341 It was darkly warned that all this would
“inevitably result in an increase in the cost of food.”342
As to all this, proponents of daylight saving urge that the farmers ought
to be willing to adjust themselves to the new conditions
notwithstanding the inconvenience and loss such conditions may
entail. The farmer with greater reason might ask that the dwellers in
cities should do this adjusting; that as his labor produces the food for
both urban and rural populations and during this war for the armies and
people of Europe, he is entitled, now that the war is over, to enjoy the
normal conditions which existed since the birth of the Republic.343

In the same report, yet another problem was cited: “‘sitting up late’ is
becoming a habit with thousands of children as well as of grown-ups,”344
and this was resulting in “the growing irritability of children and to a
reduced efficiency in school work. . . .”345 To the twenty-first century
mind, this borders on paternalism, but, in fact, a bill to repeal the
daylight saving provision was passed by Congress on August 20,
1919.346 It was then vetoed by President Wilson and subsequently
passed over the veto.347 National daylight saving time ended on the last
Sunday in October 1919.348
But, in fact, it did not end. Rather, it was the beginning of a tug of
war that would continue for most of the twentieth century with passage
and repeal of local ordinances, state legislation, and finally additional
federal daylight saving time law.349 But that saga deserves its own
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 4.
Id.
41 Stat. 280 (1919).
STEPHENS, supra note 28, at 19th unnumbered page.
41 Stat. 280 (1919). See also U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, STANDARD TIME IN THE
UNITED STATES: A HISTORY OF STANDARD AND DAYLIGHT SAVING TIME IN THE UNITED STATES
AND AN ANALYSIS OF RELATED LAWS 4 (1970).
349. The major post-World War I, twentieth century daylight saving time laws in the United
States include: Amendment to the Federal Standard Time Act, 41 Stat. 1446 (March 4, 1921)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 265); War Time Act, 56 Stat. 9 (January 20, 1942) (current version
at 15 U.S.C. § 261); Amendment to the War Time Act, 59 Stat. 537 (September 25, 1945) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 261); District of Columbia Daylight Saving Time Act, 63 Stat. 29 (March 31,
1949) (repealed in 1949); An Act to Promote the Observance of a Uniform System of Time
Throughout the United States, 80 Stat. 107 (April 13, 1966) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 260,
260a); The Uniform Time Act Amendment, 86 Stat. 116 (March 30, 1972) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 260a); Emergency Daylight Saving Time Energy Conservation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 707
(December 15, 1973) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 260a); Emergency Daylight Saving Time
Energy Conservation Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1209 (October 5, 1974) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2003

45

Akron Law Review, Vol. 36 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 1
PARRISH1.DOC

46

1/6/03 2:16 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:1

separate telling.
In terms of the Legal Process Theory described earlier, the 1918 act
was the culmination of the legal process, with a federal agency taking
over the regulation of time determination in the United States. In terms
of the history of Progressivism, and time’s small role in that complex, if
not impenetrable, history, social cohesion demanded that everyone living
their lockstep lives in the increasingly urbanized America of the early
twentieth century must tell time the same way. After a period of relative
weakness for the legislative branch where the judiciary tended to step in
and take charge of such matters, or at least tried to do so, Congress came
into its own during World War I and passed the legislation mandating
the use of standard time. Legal and historical interpetations aside,
emotion, psychology, and personal philosophy have continued to play a
large part in the way people think about time and its determination, even
into the twenty-first century.
Michael O’Malley has offered some thoughts on the dynamics of
the dispute. “Some farmers experienced genuine economic hardship as a
result of daylight saving, and many more suffered serious
inconvenience. But others resented having the arbitrary strictures of
machine time imposed on their lives.”350 There was a genuine rural
versus urban, working class versus leisure class conflict operating, and it
focused on the game of golf: “As a thoroughly non-productive, silly
game played on the coiffed and manicured surface of perfectly good
land, golf symbolized the utter decadence that underlay the daylight
saving movement. The enemies of daylight saving scorned golf, again
and again, as the wasteful indulgence of a parasitical class.”351
VII. CONCLUSION
Knowing the correct time is as important to the well-being of
modern people as any prerogative outlined in the Bill of Rights. If one
cannot determine the time with certainty, one cannot be a part of the
modern world. The truth of these statements is underscored by the fact

260a); Fire Prevention and Control Authorizations Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 764 (July 8, 1986)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 260a, 2216f); Establishment of a Standard Time Zone for Guam
and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands Act of 2000, 114 Stat. 2811 (December 23,
2000) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 261, 263, 267).
350. O’MALLEY, supra note 15, at 281.
351. Id. at 285. Golf was still an issue in 2001! Morton Marcus, an Indiana University
economist, discussing the resistance to daylight saving in Indiana “said he thought the daylight
saving time push was ‘largely driven by the desire to play golf at night.’” See Belluck, supra note
48, at A1.
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that everyone takes time determination for granted. At least it is taken
for granted until someone in authority talks about changing it.
It is axiomatic that we live by the law because it is more peaceful,
predictable and productive than living in a lawless state would be.
Determining the time is one of those societal rules that can be lawfully
regulated and should be reasonably acceptable to all citizens. Yet if this
article has shown anything, it has shown that establishing a standard
time adhered to by all turned out to be both an enormously complex
process and one that is still evolving.
Time does not simply regulate our activities. The awareness of
time has gotten inside our minds and our souls and is a part of our very
self-identification. That makes it far less susceptible to standardized
definition. Looking at the sun in a previous era reminded us of our
puniness and the triviality of our concerns. The sun was “up there”
where God is believed to reside. So, telling the time by the sun was
necessarily a religious experience, certainly a deeply personal one.
Looking at a clock on the wall, or the watch on one’s wrist, or the digital
readout in the lower corner of one’s computer screen just does not
compare. No longer a private matter, time determination has officially
become public law-bound and regulated.
Unofficially, time
determination remains mysterious and elusive.
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